geneva conventions

Autonomous Weapons Systems and Proportionality – New Article

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Published a new law review article, “Autonomous Weapons Systems and Proportionality: The Need for Regulation,” in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 57:1 (2025). The full text is available for download at SSRN here, and the abstract is below:

This article examines the question of whether International Humanitarian Law (IHL) requires modification to effectively govern autonomous weapons systems (AWS). While extensive scholarly discourse has focused on whether AWS can comply with existing IHL principles, and whether the development and deployment of AWS should be constrained through weapons treaties, insufficient attention has been paid to why and how IHL itself might need adaptation to regulate AWS as a method of warfare. Given that the imminent development and deployment is unlikely to be prohibited, and that AWS may not comply with IHL in certain circumstances, the question of why and how IHL needs to be adjusted is important. The analysis focuses on the principle of proportionality as a means of exploring and illustrating the issue.

The article first traces the evolution of AWS governance debates, highlighting the impasse at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) regarding constraints on AWS development. It then conducts a detailed examination of the distinct elements and operation of the principle of proportionality, a principle whose implementation demands complex, contextual, and sophisticated judgment.

The article examines the evidence of certain weaknesses of AI-operated AWS, explains why the operationalization of the principle of proportionality would present challenges for such systems, and argues that AWS would likely struggle to implement the principle reliably and predictably in certain operational contexts. The final section supports and defends proposals for the certain adjustments or modifications of IHL to better regulate AWS, thereby ensuring AWS operations remain constrained by the core principles of IHL. It ends by briefly exploring the mechanisms that might be available for developing such constraints.

Discussing Autonomous Weapons Systems and IHL at Case Western Law

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Case Western University School of Law’s annual international law symposium this year focused on the question of whether the Geneva Conventions, enjoying their 75th Anniversary, need to be updated to deal with new challenges, including the application of IHL to space, expanding transnational conflicts with non-state actors, cyber-war, and the development and deployment of fully autonomous weapons systems. The conference began with a closed experts group meeting to discuss the development of a white paper on the issues, followed by an open conference with panels on each of the major topics.

My panel, with Laurie Blank of Emory Univ. Law, Milena Sterio of Cleveland Univ. Law, and Romina Morello of the ICRC, fielded questions from Paul Williams of American Univ. Law, on whether, and how, the Geneva Conventions might need to be updated in some form to better regulate the use of autonomous weapons systems. My article on the subject will be published next year in the Case Western Journal of International Law. Great conference.

Bagram Prison, the U.S.-Afghani Detainee Agreements, and Int’l Law

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The New York Times carried a detailed piece on the U.S. detention policy in Afghanistan on Monday, January 7, 2007. It is an excellent overview on the prison, but the information provided in the piece gives rise to a number of international law issues that are not explicitly discussed or acknowledged in the article itself. I first review the salient facts, and then turn to the issues.

The facts

It reviewed the history of Bagram Prison and the extent to which it was in many respects worse than the facility in Guantanamo Bay. There are over 600 detainees being held there, most of whom have not been charged with any offence or been subject to any legal proceeding. Some have been held without charge for more than five years. The average detention is over 14 months long. Moreover, while U.S. authorities claim that all detainees are to be processed and “registered” within fourteen days of admission, and thus accessible to the International Red Cross when it visits, they also conceded that there were exceptions. An IRC confidential report, according to administration sources, claims that it has been denied access to a “warren of isolation cells” in the Bagram facility.

But what is more striking from the article is the account of how the U.S. Defence Department officials applied pressure on the Karzai administration to establish a regime of indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” along the lines of the so-called legal framework of Guantanamo Bay. President Karzai refused to sign the decree drafted with U.S. assistance to authorize and establish the regime.

A 2005 agreement to transfer the bulk of detainees to Afghanistan was the basis for a more detailed plan of transfer, as outlined in an exchange of diplomatic notes. The notes reflect that the U.S. sought to have the Afghanistan government share any intelligence obtained from detainees, to “utilize all methods appropriate and permissible under Afghan law to surveil or monitor their activities following any release,” and “confiscate or deny passports and take measures to prevent each national from travelling outside Afghanistan.”

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