第９条の新解釈を押し付けようとすることの致命的な欠陥

一般に柳井報告として知られている「安全保障の法的基盤の再構築に関する懇談会」報告は、日本が集団的自衛および集団安全保障活動に参加することを可能にするためには、日本国憲法第９条の再解釈が必要であると主張している。現在は、いずれの活動も、第９条第１項で禁止されていると解されている。しかし、この報告書は、懇談会の分析の正当性を根底から覆す根本的欠陥を明らかにしている。

懇談会は2007年4月に、安倍晋三内閣（当時）によって、憲法の「再解釈」の必要性を検討するために設置された。懇談会は、13人の著名な学者、元外交官、その大部分は国際関係、政治、国家安全保障の専門家である官僚たちで構成されたていた。懇談会のメンバーの中に憲法学者は一人しかいなかった。懇談会は、憲法改正に賛成していることが公に知られているタカ派によって占められていると批判された。座長の柳井俊二は、元アメリカ大使であり、現在は中央大学教授であるが、6月に内閣に懇談会報告を提出した。

当時の福田康夫首相は、この報告書すなわち憲法の「再解釈」にはほとんど興味を示さなかった。しかし麻生首相は、第９条は「再解釈」されなければならないと、国連で繰り返し述べた。さらに柳井報告書が、官僚たちの間で歓迎され、政府内において次第に影響力を行使しそうな証拠がある。したがってこの報告書は、もっと公に吟味の対象とならなければならないのである。

この報告書は、冷戦終結以降、日本および国際社会には脅威が増大し、脅威の種類も様々になって国際的な安全保障の環境が変化したため、これまで確立されてきた憲法の解釈は、もはや適切ではないと主張している。むしろ、９条は重要な安全保障の目的の遂行を妨げているというのである。

このように、この報告書は、一層効果的な防衛力と一層強固な国家安全政策の展開を可能にするために、第９条の解釈は「改め」なれなければならないと主張している。日本を効果的に防衛し、日本の安全保障にとっての要である日米安全保障条約を支持し、日本の安全保障につながる国際的な平和と安全保障に貢献するという戦略的に緊急性を要することがらを遂行するためにはこれが必要であるというのである。要するに報告書の主張するところは煎じつめればこうである。「日本はより多くの脅威にさらされている。したがって、第９条の意味は、われわれがこれらの脅威によりよく対処できるように変えられなければない」。

（このような）政治的分析は賞賛に値する。しかし、憲法的分析としては、このような主張は、不合理である。現在の（国際）状況が提起した諸問題を識別するところから始めて、（次に）これらの諸問題を解決するのに必要な政治的対応を決定することに移り、それからそのような政策を採用することを促すための憲法条項の解釈に終わるというアプローチそのものが全く不合理なのである。

いかなる憲法理論の定説においても、憲法の解釈は、ある特定の条項の結論や政治的な関連問題から出発し、次にその条項の意味を政治的に望ましい成果を実現できるようなやり方で反対向きに移っていくことはできない。そのような結果志向の論法は、明らかに説得力に欠ける。それどころか、報告書の中で主張されているところとは異なり、懇談会が行ったのはまさしくこのことなのである。

憲法は自国の基本的な法的枠組みを形成している。その諸条項は、将来の世代に対して、このようにつくられたシステムの制限内で、かつ憲法が具体化した価値や理想に従って行動することを義務付けている。ある憲法条項の意味は、その条項それ自体の正文を考慮し、その条項が達成するように企図されている目的を理解して決定しなければならない。そうしたプロセスを助けるものに、憲法の他の部分への考慮や憲法制定・批准の歴史がある。それらは、そのプロセスの中で書き上げられた法的諸原則が教えてくれる。

基本的な法原則を運用するにあたって、一貫性、安定性、予測可能性は、法治主義にとって決定的に重要であるから、その条項の裁判所や憲法上必要な権限を備えた統治機構によるその後の解釈や長年にわたるその運用もまた解釈のための重要な基準である。

憲法解釈については様々な理論がある。他のものに比べ、正本と憲法制定者意思により結合しているものもあるし、憲法は、裁判所における解釈の長年にわたる積み重ねを通して、また価値観の変動や国の現実状況に伴って徐々に発展する生きた制度であるということを強調する研究方法もある。しかし、認識された政治上の必要性に合わせるため、その場しのぎの極端な政府による条項再解釈を予定するような憲法解釈論は存在しない。

仮に、国の状況に重要な変化が、ある憲法の条項を継続して持ち続けることに疑義が生ずるほどのものになった場合には、適切な道は憲法を改正することである。状況の変化、さらには価値観の変化でさえも、明らかに予定されている。通常（憲法）改正手続きは憲法システムの一部分をなしている。日本国憲法に例外ではない。日本国憲法はドイツやアメリカ合衆国よりも簡単な改正手続きをもっているのである。

その場しのぎの「解釈」とりわけ行政府のその場しのぎの「解釈」は、まさしく正統な憲法改正手続きを回避する究極のやり方なのである。

もし国民の多数はそのような改正を支持しないだろうというのであれば、それは、国民の多数が賛同しない新しい意味を憲法に押し付けようとすることの不合理性を際立たせるだけである。そもそも、「状況が変わった。だから我々は憲法を変えなくてはならない」という議論は、まったく正当なものである。しかし「状況が変わった。だから憲法の意味は変わらなければならない」という議論は正当なものではない。

もし政府が状況の変化を理由に第９条を「再解釈」することが簡単にできるなら、ほかの条項ではなぜそれができないということになるのか。日本への移民の数が、高齢者の人口という難問に反応を示して増加するならば、政府はもはや外国人に対する差別を禁止するものではないとして、第１４条をも「再解釈」することができるのであろうか。いかなる条項の「再解釈」をも、憲法の構造全体を危機に陥れることになる。もちろん、裁判所は憲法を解釈する最終的な権威をもっている。しかし日本の最高裁判所は歴史的に、こうした状況では頼りにならないほど政府に敬意を示してきた。

アメリカ合衆国の銃の問題を考えてみよう。多数のアメリカ人やおそらく世界の他のほとんどの国の人々は、先進国の中で、最も殺人や暴力の発生率が高い国で、個人に小火器を保所持する権利を保障している憲法条項を持つということは、誤っていると考えている。その条項すなわち修正第２条は、２００年以上も前に批准されたものである。それは、多くの人々によって、時代錯誤であり、かつアメリカにおける銃という現代の社会悪を減らすための努力に対する重大な障害となっていると考えられている。

しかし、アメリカ合衆国大統領や連邦議会が、すべての小火器を法的に禁止することを可能にするために、修正第２条を「再解釈」するなどということは全く想像すらできないことである。そして、アメリカ合衆国憲法修正第２条は、日本国憲法第９条よりずっとあいまいであり、もっと複雑な歴史をもっている。最近コロンビア州自治区が最高裁判所の前で行ったように、妥当な憲法解釈の諸原則に基づいているならば、別の解釈の方が、より妥当なものとなる。しかし、アメリカでは銃があまりにも多くの人々を殺しているので、修正第２条はいまや何か別のものを意味するようになったと政府が簡単に主張することはできないのである。

柳井報告は、変化しつつある国際的な安全保障環境について重要な分析をしており、また日本の戦略的な政策の必要性について簡潔な表現で述べている。それは、日本が第９条の制約内で国家安全保障の目的に応えることができるかどうかという重要な疑問を提起している。

柳井報告はまた、憲法改正に賛成する立場に立って、提出するのが妥当な重要な議論を提供している。報告書はさらに、報告書が奨励している変化によって可能となる軍事力の行使を制約するために設けられるべき法的な限界について、かなり詳細かつ見事な勧告を行っている。報告書は政治的な文書としては、少なからぬ価値をもっている。

しかし、第９条が、このようにして長期にわたって確立してきた解釈とは異なる意味を持つべきだという報告書の結論は、まったく説得力に欠ける。懇談会は、その解釈論のいくつかの項目において、誤りをおかしている。しかし、アプローチ全体の非論理性は、これらの誤りを目立たなくさせている。

上述したように、柳井報告は、その政治的分析に価値がありうるとは言えても、憲法の意味に対していかなる影響力をもってはならない。そして報告書に従おうとする政府の試みは、問題とされなければないのである。

以上

（常岡せつ子教授翻訳）

Part III, Section 1 – Opinions and Their Premises Regarding the 4 Scenarios: the panel returns to the question of constitutional interpretation, this time explaining “The Panel’s Fundamental Understanding of Art. 9.” In section one of this part, the panel outlines its opinion and its underlying assumptions with respect to the four problems. After rehashing the changes in threats already discussed above, it articulates the two assumptions that underlie its recommendations for the minimum necessary changes to the interpretation of the Constitution. These are i) that there must be continued maintenance of pacifism and international cooperation as fundamental principles of the Constitution; and ii) even where there is the exercise of collective self-defence or collective security operations under a new national security policy, it cannot be without limits. The panel indicates that the specific limitations will be discussed in Part IV.

Part III, Section 2 – The Interpretation of Art. 9: The panel turns next to its own interpretation of Art. 9. It again summarizes the government interpretation, then begins its discussion with the assertion that in interpreting laws and the Constitution, while it may be natural to interpret the text of each provision, it is also necessary to examine the entire context of the law in its entirety, the history of its formation, the country’s national strategies, the society as a whole, the economy, and other related circumstances.

Moreover, the panel continues, in the event that a particular provision has some connection with international relations, then it is also necessary to consider the concepts and language of those provision as they are understood in international law. All of this is all the more important when it is the Constitution that is being considered. Since the features of Art. 9, such as war, use of force, individual self-defence, collective self-defence, collective security and so forth, are all international law concepts, it is impossible to interpret them without an understanding of international law and international relations.

The report concludes this section, prior to any analysis of the text, history, or international law perspectives relating to the provision, with the assertion that the government interpretation reflects the international relations of the post-war period and Cold War era, and repeats that the circumstances have changed since then.

Part III, Section 3 – Collective Self-Defence: In this section the panel finally gets to the text of Art. 9, and argues that it does not support the government interpretation that Japan, as a state, is entirely forbidden from using force in international relations. After citing the language of Art. 9, the panel draws attention to the clause “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes”, and emphasizes that it does not contain any provision to the effect that “Japan, as a state, is completely prohibited from exercising the use of its actual capabilities in foreign relations”, but rather, only war as a sovereign right and the use of force “to resolve international disputes” is forever renounced. Thus, the argument continues, the better view is that not only individual self-defence but also the exercise of collective self-defence and collective security operations are actually outside of the scope of the prohibition. [This argument will be analyzed in detain at the end of the review of the report]

The panel argues that the concept of war renunciation in Art. 9(1) has a long history, from the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the League of Nations, the U.N. Charter, and similar instruments of international law, and in that historical development, there is not one instance of the concept including any prohibition on individual self-defence, collective self-defence, or collective security operations. On the contrary, the idea of the renunciation of war is predicated on the premise that international disputes will be resolved by peaceful measures, and by the use of force within the collective security system, through international cooperation under first the League of Nations, and later the U.N. Charter. It was part of the emergence of a system that prohibited the use of force by individual states to resolve disputes.

Looked at from this background, the panel explains, Japan, while promising unilaterally to no longer use force to resolve its own national disputes, on the other hand, ought not to take the position that it will not support international peace or participate actively in the restoration of international peace. Moreover, Art. 9 is based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which provided that “the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”

Thus, if, as already explained by the panel, it is accepted that Art. 9(1) (renouncing as a sovereign right of the nation war and the use of force for the settlement of international disputes) is not understood to prohibit collective self-defence or the participation in collective security operations, then, the first sentence of Art. 9(2), “in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained” should be read as not prohibiting the maintenance of military forces for the purposes of self-defence and participating in collective self-defence operations. [This is the standard argument regarding the so-called ‘Ashida amendment’, which I will explain in the analysis at the end]

The panel then turns to the so-called “belligerency clause” in Art. 9(2), which provides that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” The panel argues that this clause means that the “rights of belligerency” that are recognized in international law will not be recognized, and in particular, this means that the rights in international law relating to the commencement of war, termination of war, and so forth will not be recognized. This is, the panel explains, quite natural given the renunciation of “war as a sovereign right of the nation” in Art. 9(1), but the clause is thought of as a confirmation of that provision. Continuing, the panel blithely asserts that, on the other hand, it is clear that the “right of belligerency” that are not recognized in this provision are not the rights and obligations in the international humanitarian law in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and similar instruments. [This argument is manifestly incorrect, and will be addressed in some detain in the discussion at the end]

Part III, Section 4 – The conditions for the exercise of the right to self-defence: As touched on in Part I, the government has formerly established three conditions for the exercise of the right to self-defence under Art. 9, namely: 1) the existence of an imminent and unjustified invasion (shingai) of Japan; 2) there are no other appropriate means of repulsing the invasion; and 3) the exercise of the right stops at the minimum necessary level of the use of force (jitsuryoku, as opposed to buryoku, or armed force, as is used in Art. 9 itself). However, the first condition obviously assumes only the right of individual self-defence. But if collective self-defence is also recognized, then this condition needs to be changed. The panel also notes that the concept of “imminent unjustified invasion”, is obviously different from the condition precedent for the exercise of self-defence pursuant to the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter reflects the history of abuse of the right to self-defence prior to World War II, under the ambiguous condition of “imminent invasion”. Thus, in Art. 51 of the Charter the condition for exercise of the right was limited to the occurrence of an “armed attack”. But, the panel continues, if for some reason the U.N. Charter does not apply [i.e. the condition has not been satisfied], it does not mean that there can be scope for the right of self-defence under customary international law, in response to an “imminent unjust invasion” or a “use of force not reaching the level of armed attack” and so forth, and that fact is recognized in international court decisions. But, the panel concedes, this is restricted to extremely limited situations.

With respect to this problem, the panel explains, there is an argument in Japan based on the concept of “minor right of self-defence”, but this term is also ambiguous, and has not received sufficient international understanding. The panel goes on to note that, in the context of this concept, the exercise of the right to self- defence in Japan is predicated on the issuance of an order for the mobilization of defence forces, and the mobilization of the SDF is subjected the onerous procedural pre-conditions of there having been passage of a UNSC Resolution, and in addition, prior approval of the legislature. The panel argues that all of this means that in an urgent situation, it will not be possible for Japan to respond appropriately prior to the issuance of the command for mobilization of the military. These procedures are not thought to effectively respond to ballistic missile attack, terrorism, and other such new threats, and there ought to be consideration given to a legal system that can promptly and effectively respond to such threats.

Part III, Section 5 – The Possession and Use of the Right of Collective Self-Defence, and the Concept of International Dispute: The panel begins this section by noting that the government position on collective self-defence, as first stated on March 31, 1960, is that in terms of the core sense of the concept of deployment abroad to defend some other country, collective self-defence is not recognized in Japan’s Constitution. But the panel argues that in terms of the other aspects of the concept, the government has not made clear statements, notwithstanding the inconsistency of its position with academic theory. The current government view of collective self-defence was first stated in a committee meeting of the Diet on October 14, 1972, and was reiterated on May 29, 1981 in the following language:

It is therefore self-evident that since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law. The Japanese government nevertheless takes the view that the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article IX of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country. The government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the Constitution. [This translation of the government position appears in Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan (2007)]

The panel then asks the question, how should one consider the relationship between the “possession” of a right and the “exercise” of the right? In the context of its recognition of the right to self-defence, while not recognizing the ability to exercise the right of collective self-defence, the government has not done enough to explain the precise grounds for its position, and thus has not sufficiently obtained the understanding of the people.

Moreover, the panel continues, the term “international disputes” in the clause “as a means of resolving international disputes” in Art 9(1), relates to the renunciation of the use of armed force by Japan as an individual state for the purpose of resolving international disputes to which it has become a party. This must be distinguished from circumstances in which Japan, acting under the framework of the U.N. and through international peacekeeping activity, cooperates to resolve an international dispute between third countries, as anticipated in by the preamble of the Constitution, which provides that “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone…”.

In the final section of this Part, the panel simply summarizes the foregoing. In Part IV, it makes its specific recommendations regarding the four scenarios under examination, and other related matters, which I will review briefly in the next post. The next post will also engage in a critical analysis of the arguments that the panel has provided, particularly those in Part III on the interpretation of Art. 9.

The report of the “Panel on the Reconstruction of the National Security Legal Foundation,” commonly known as the Yanai Report, argues that a reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution is necessary to permit Japan to participate in collective self-defense and collective security operations. Both activities are currently understood to be prohibited by Article 9, Section 1. The report reveals, however, a fundamental flaw that entirely undermines the legitimacy of the panel’s analysis.

The panel was created in April 2007 by then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to consider the need for a “reinterpretation” of the Constitution. The panel was composed of 13 prominent academics, former diplomats and government bureaucrats who were predominantly experts in international relations, politics and national security. It included only one constitutional scholar. The panel was criticized for being dominated by policy hawks who were on record as favoring constitutional revision. The chair, Yanai Shunji, a former ambassador to the U.S. and now a professor of Chuo University, submitted the panel’s report to the Cabinet in June.

Then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda showed little interest in the report or constitutional “reinterpretation.” But Prime Minister Aso reiterated while at the United Nations that Article 9 should be “reinterpreted.” Moreover, there is evidence that the Yanai Report has been well received within the bureaucracy, and is likely to exercise increasing influence within government. It should therefore be the subject of greater public scrutiny.

The report argues that because the international security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War, with increased threats and more diverse threats to Japan and the international society, the established interpretation of the Constitution is no longer appropriate. Rather, Article 9 is preventing the fulfillment of important security objectives.

Thus, it argues, the interpretation of Article 9 must be “revised” so as to permit the development of a more effective defense capability and more robust national security policies. This is necessary in order to implement the strategic imperatives of effectively defending Japan, supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is key to Japanese security, and contributing to the international peace and security to which Japan’s security is tied. Boiled down to its essence, the argument is this: Japan faces more threats; therefore, the meaning of Article 9 must be changed so that we can better meet those threats.

The policy analysis is commendable, but as constitutional analysis, the argument is fallacious. The entire approach of beginning with an identification of the problems posed by current circumstances, moving to a determination of the policy responses necessary to resolve those problems, and then concluding with an interpretation of a constitutional provision so as to facilitate the adoption of such policies, is entirely illegitimate.

Constitutional interpretation, under any accepted constitutional theory, cannot begin with the consequences and policy ramifications of a given provision and then proceed to reverse-engineer the meaning of the provision in a manner designed to enable the realization of the desired policy outcomes. Such result-oriented reasoning is simply invalid. And notwithstanding assertions within the report to the contrary, this is precisely what the panel has done.

A constitution forms the fundamental legal framework of a democratic state. Its provisions commit future generations to operate within the confines of the system thus created, and according to the values and vision that it embodies. The meaning of a constitutional provision has to be determined by reference to the text of the provision itself, and an understanding of the purpose that it was designed to achieve. That process is assisted by reference to other parts of the constitution, and an examination of the history of the drafting and ratification of the constitution, informed by the legal principles that were drawn upon in the process.

The subsequent interpretation of the provision by the courts and other government bodies with the requisite constitutional authority, and its operation over time, are also important guides to interpretation, as consistency, stability and predictability in the operation of fundamental legal principles are crucially important to the rule of law.

There are different theories of constitutional interpretation, some more wedded to the text and the original intent of the framers than others. Some approaches emphasize that the constitution is a living institution that will evolve gradually over time through incremental developments in court interpretations, in accordance with the shifting values and realities of the nation. But none of them contemplate ad hoc and radical government reinterpretation of provisions to fit perceived policy needs.

If there is such significant change to the nation’s circumstances that the continued legitimacy of a constitutional provision is thrown into question, then the appropriate avenue is constitutional amendment. Changing circumstances and even changing values are obviously anticipated, and amending procedures are typically part of the constitutional system. The Constitution of Japan is no exception, and it has an amendment process that is less onerous than those of Germany and the United States.

Ad hoc “reinterpretation,” particularly by the executive, is just an end run around the legitimate amendment procedures of the Constitution.

If the view is that the majority of the nation would not support such an amendment, then that simply highlights the illegitimacy of trying to impose a new meaning on the Constitution that the majority of the people would disagree with. At root, the argument that “the situation has changed, so we must change the Constitution” is perfectly valid; the argument that “the situation has changed, so the meaning of the Constitution must have changed” is not.

If the government can simply “reinterpret” Article 9 due to changing circumstances, why not other provisions? As the number of immigrants in Japan increases in response to the challenges of an aging population, could the government not also “reinterpret” Article 14 as no longer prohibiting discrimination against foreigners? A “reinterpretation” of any one provision puts the entire constitutional framework at risk. Of course, the courts have the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution and could reject such “reinterpretations,” but the Supreme Court of Japan has historically demonstrated such deference to the government that it cannot be relied upon in this context.

Consider the issue of guns in the U.S. Many Americans, and probably most of the rest of the world, think it misguided to have a constitutional provision guaranteeing an individual right to possess firearms in a country that has the highest homicide and violent crime rates in the industrialized world. The provision itself, the Second Amendment, was ratified more than 200 years ago. It is considered by many to be anachronistic and a significant obstacle in efforts to reduce the modern scourge of gun violence in America.

Yet it is utterly inconceivable that the president or Congress could announce that it was “reinterpreting” the Second Amendment so as to permit the legal prohibition of all firearms. And the Second Amendment is much more ambiguous and has a much more complex history than Article 9. It would be open to argue, as the District of Columbia did recently before the Supreme Court, that based on valid principles of constitutional construction, an alternate interpretation is more legitimate. But governments cannot simply claim that the Second Amendment now means something different because guns kill too many people in America.

The Yanai Report provides an important analysis of the changing international security environment, and provides a concise articulation of Japan’s strategic policy requirements. It asks important questions regarding whether it is possible for Japan to meet its national security objectives within the constraints of Article 9.

It also offers significant arguments that could be legitimately advanced in favor of constitutional amendment. The report even provides fairly detailed and impressive recommendations on the legal limits that should be created to govern the exercise of military force that would be made possible by its recommended changes. The report has considerable value as a policy document.

However, its conclusion that Article 9 must thus have a meaning different from the long-established interpretation is simply invalid. The panel makes errors in some of the details of its interpretive arguments, but these are dwarfed by the illegitimacy of the entire approach.

As such, notwithstanding the potential value of its policy analysis, the report ought not to have any influence whatsoever on the meaning of the Constitution. And government attempts to follow it ought to be challenged.