Challenging and Refining the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine

My latest law review article has just been published: “Challenging and Refining the ‘Unwilling or Unable’ Doctrine,” 52 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 245 (2019). The abstract is as follows:

This Article challenges and proposes refinements to the “unwilling or unable” doctrine. Governments after 9/11 have invoked the doctrine to justify the use of force in self-defense against non-state actors (NSAs) operating within the territory of nonconsenting states. Responding to criticism that it lacked substance and a legal foundation, Daniel Bethlehem famously developed more detailed principles to embed the policy firmly in law, strike a balance between the interests of target states and territorial states, and bridge the gap between scholars and policy makers. His principles were embraced by governments as reflecting custom. The effort was laudable, but the principles fell short of their objective, and they create a risk of destabilizing the jus ad bellum regime.

This Article notes that the principles do not reflect custom, and it examines some of the ways in which they are inconsistent with the established understanding of the jus ad bellum regime. Specifically, they: lower the threshold for what constitutes an armed attack; eviscerate the temporal component from the concept of imminence, thereby destabilizing the core principle of necessity; improperly import the law of state responsibility into the jus ad bellum analysis; and undermine the independence of the international humanitarian law (IHL) and the jus ad bellum regimes. Finally, the principles do not provide sufficient guidance on how or by whom a range of key determinations are to be made, particularly regarding the “ability” or “unwillingness” of the territorial state. The principles lump all these determinations together, and suggest that they may all be made unilaterally by the target state, governed only by a single, low reasonableness standard. All of this weakens the constraints of the jus ad bellum regime more generally, thus raising the risk of inter-state war.

The Article takes seriously the operational imperatives in dealing with the threat posed by terrorist organizations, but proposes refinements to the principles to address each of these problems, so as to achieve greater consistency with established principles of the jus ad bellum regime. It develops new ideas on imminence, and drawing upon theories of self-judgment in international law, it disaggregates the decisions that have to be made and proposes differentiated standards to govern their execution and later assessment.

Jus ad Bellum Implications of Japan’s New National Security Laws

(Published in Opinio Juris, Apr. 21, 2016; re-published in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol. 14, May 15, 2016)

Far-reaching revisions to Japan’s national security laws became effective at the end of March. Part of the government’s efforts to “reinterpret” Japan’s war-renouncing Constitution, the revised laws authorize military action that would previously have been unconstitutional. The move has been severely criticized within Japan as being a circumvention and violation of the Constitution, but there has been far less scrutiny of the international law implications of the changes.

The war-renouncing provision of the Constitution ensured compliance with the jus ad bellum regime, and indeed Japan has not engaged in a use of force since World War II. But with the purported “reinterpretation” and revised laws – which the Prime Minister has said would permit Japan to engage in minesweeping in the Straits of Hormuz or use force to defend disputed islands from foreign “infringements” – Japan has an unstable and ambiguous new domestic law regime that could potentially authorize action that would violate international law. … Read more…

Undermining the Rule of Law – Tokyo Shinbun Interview

(Interview with Yoichi Takeuchi, in the Tokyo Shinbun, Jun. 30, 2014)

Martin-TS.Interview-Jun.2014

法の支配揺るがす ≪解釈改憲≫ 米の法学者はこう見る(東京新聞6月30日)

安倍政権は集団的自衛権の行使容認に向け憲法9条の解釈変更を7月1日にも閣議決定しようとしている。米政府や識者の多くは日本に集団的自衛権の行使容認をかねて働き掛けており、支持している。だが、政府の独断による解釈改憲は「日本の法の支配を揺るがす」と異を唱える法学者もいる。米中西部カンザス州のウォッシュバーン大学法科大学院のクレイグ・マーチン准教授(53)に聞いた。(アメリカ総局・竹内洋一)

-第1次安倍内閣の当時から解釈改憲には反対を主張してきた。その理由は。

「解釈改憲は憲法の改正規定を犯している。時の政権が不都合な条項を思い付きで簡単に変えられるなら憲法はもはや最高法規ではなくなる。『法の支配』を支える最も基本的で本質的な原則にも反している。法の下の平等だ。改正手続きを無視して解釈改憲を閣議決定すれば、内閣を法の上に置くことになる」

-閣議決定までの手続きも有識者会議や与党協議だけだった。

「憲法に定められた国権の最高機関である国会、違憲審査権を持つ最高裁には諮られていない。内閣の独断で改憲を宣言するのは、完全に違法で無効だ。憲法改正には国会での審議が必要だ。選挙に勝利した与党の協議でも、違法な手続きは正当化されない」

-安倍政権は「日本を取り巻く安全保障環境の変化」を憲法解釈を変える理由の一つに挙げているが。 … Read more…