Article Examining Japan’s “Reinterpretation” of Article 9 Through the Lens of Informal Amendment Theory

My latest big law review article has just been published: “The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the ‘Reinterpretation’ of Japan’s War Powers,” 40 Fordham International Law Journal 427 (2017). It  analyzes the “reinterpretation” of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan for what insights it can offer our understanding of theories of informal constitutional amendment. At the same time it examines what those theories can tell us about the legitimacy of the Japanese “reinterpretation.” The abstract is as follows:

The government of Japan has purported to reinterpret the famous war-renouncing provision of the Constitution in a controversial process that deliberately circumvented the formal amendment procedure. This article argues that these developments should be of great interest to constitutional law scholars in America because they bring into sharp focus issues that remain underdeveloped and unresolved in the debate over informal amendment. Theories on informal amendment suggest that there are some constitutional changes that exceed the reasonable range of normal interpretive development, but which are not implemented through formal amendment procedures. The existence, scope, and legitimacy of such informal amendments remains hotly contested.

This article focuses on the key issue of legitimacy. It uses the Japanese reinterpretation as the context in which to explore the relationship among three suggested factors affecting the legitimacy of informal amendment, namely: the public ratification of the change; the intent of the agents of the change; and the passage of time. It also suggests a new way of conceptualizing the relationship among authority, legitimacy, and time in thinking about informal amendments, in that the level of constitutional authority and degree of legitimacy that may be enjoyed by contested changes will begin to diverge with the passage of time.

The article argues that deliberate attempts to effect significant constitutional change in a manner calculated to circumvent the formal amendment process—such as the Abe government’s reinterpretation effort in Japan—are prima facie unauthorized and illegitimate at the time they occur. Moreover, only the most explicit and deliberate expressions of popular sovereignty can serve to legitimate such changes. But while such deliberate informal change will always remain unauthorized, it may be legitimated with the passage of time. I argue that this legitimation may, and should, take longer than for less contested forms of change.

Jus ad Bellum Implications of Japan’s New National Security Laws

(Published in Opinio Juris, Apr. 21, 2016; re-published in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol. 14, May 15, 2016)

Far-reaching revisions to Japan’s national security laws became effective at the end of March. Part of the government’s efforts to “reinterpret” Japan’s war-renouncing Constitution, the revised laws authorize military action that would previously have been unconstitutional. The move has been severely criticized within Japan as being a circumvention and violation of the Constitution, but there has been far less scrutiny of the international law implications of the changes.

The war-renouncing provision of the Constitution ensured compliance with the jus ad bellum regime, and indeed Japan has not engaged in a use of force since World War II. But with the purported “reinterpretation” and revised laws – which the Prime Minister has said would permit Japan to engage in minesweeping in the Straits of Hormuz or use force to defend disputed islands from foreign “infringements” – Japan has an unstable and ambiguous new domestic law regime that could potentially authorize action that would violate international law. … Read more…

Obama Administration Fails to Address Legality of Targeted Killing

(Published in the Truman Doctrine blog, May, 2012)

In a speech at the Wilson Center on April 30, John Brennan, Assistant to the President on Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, addressed the subject of targeted killing. In particular, he set out to explain the legality, ethics, and operational wisdom of the policy of using drone-mounted missiles to kill suspected terrorists and insurgents in countries other than Afghanistan – that is countries with which the U.S. is not in an armed conflict. His speech was the most elaborate and open statement yet by the administration on the policy, which remains officially covert, but it provided little new analysis, and it did not respond to the most fundamental challenges to the policy.

The stated objective was a laudable one. He acknowledged that the U.S. policy of targeted killing has been the subject of significant international criticism. He referred to President Obama’s commitment, made in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, that the “United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war,” and that “all nations, strong and weak alike, must adhere to standards that govern the use of force.” Moreover, Brennan stated that President Obama understands the need for greater transparency, and the requirement to explain to both the American people and the world the rationales for the policy.

Unfortunately, however, Brennan provided little new analysis to explain how the targeted killing adheres to the governing principles of international law. Harold Koh, legal counsel to the State Department, provided the basic legal justification two years ago – that is, that the U.S. is in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, such that members of those groups can be lawfully targeted as combatants in an armed conflict; and that the U.S. is entitled to use force in the exercise of its inherent right of self- defense. … Read more…

U.S. Missile Strikes in Somalia and the Laws of War

As was reported in the New York Times and elsewhere on May 2, the U.S. fired at least four Tomahawk cruise missiles into Somalia, striking a compound in the town of Dusa Marreb, killing at least ten people. One of them, the primary target of the attack, was an alleged Al Qaeda operative named Aden Hashi Ayro, who was suspected of having killed a BBC journalist among other things. He was reported to be a notorious terrorist.

Several blog posts have noted the lack of mainstream discussion on the legality of this missile strike. Prof. Marty Lederman, writing in Slate, suggested that few seem to care whether it was legal. But even among the bloggers, the majority of posts I have seen, as in the case of Prof. Lederman’s, have focused primarily on the constitutional issues of whether the President had sufficient authority, explicit or otherwise, to launch such attacks. There has been some discussion of the jus in bello issues, such as whether the strikes met the criteria of military necessity and proportionality, given the apparent collateral damage. But few have addressed the jus ad bellum issues – was this missile strike, and those prior to it (there have been several such attacks on Somalia since 2006) lawful under the international laws on the use of armed force?

Developments in jus ad bellum?

Prof. Jullian Ku was one of few that has raised the issue, on Opinio Juris, but he merely floated the idea that since such strikes have met with little objection, they may be evidence that the U.S. is operating in a legal paradigm that approximates that of war. Implicit in this is the proposition that there have been developments in international law on the use of force since 9/11 that permit one to wage war on organizations, and which give the global “war on terror” a legal foundation that would permit such strikes against Al Qaeda operatives at large in a “failed state”.

As I commented on his post over at Opinio Juris, I question whether the fact that there has been little formal objection to the strike can be said to support the inference that the strikes were therefore lawful or justifiable under international law, or that it reflects developments in international law that permit such strikes. … Read more…