第９条の新解釈を押し付けようとすることの致命的な欠陥

一般に柳井報告として知られている「安全保障の法的基盤の再構築に関する懇談会」報告は、日本が集団的自衛および集団安全保障活動に参加することを可能にするためには、日本国憲法第９条の再解釈が必要であると主張している。現在は、いずれの活動も、第９条第１項で禁止されていると解されている。しかし、この報告書は、懇談会の分析の正当性を根底から覆す根本的欠陥を明らかにしている。

懇談会は2007年4月に、安倍晋三内閣（当時）によって、憲法の「再解釈」の必要性を検討するために設置された。懇談会は、13人の著名な学者、元外交官、その大部分は国際関係、政治、国家安全保障の専門家である官僚たちで構成されたていた。懇談会のメンバーの中に憲法学者は一人しかいなかった。懇談会は、憲法改正に賛成していることが公に知られているタカ派によって占められていると批判された。座長の柳井俊二は、元アメリカ大使であり、現在は中央大学教授であるが、6月に内閣に懇談会報告を提出した。

当時の福田康夫首相は、この報告書すなわち憲法の「再解釈」にはほとんど興味を示さなかった。しかし麻生首相は、第９条は「再解釈」されなければならないと、国連で繰り返し述べた。さらに柳井報告書が、官僚たちの間で歓迎され、政府内において次第に影響力を行使しそうな証拠がある。したがってこの報告書は、もっと公に吟味の対象とならなければならないのである。

この報告書は、冷戦終結以降、日本および国際社会には脅威が増大し、脅威の種類も様々になって国際的な安全保障の環境が変化したため、これまで確立されてきた憲法の解釈は、もはや適切ではないと主張している。むしろ、９条は重要な安全保障の目的の遂行を妨げているというのである。

このように、この報告書は、一層効果的な防衛力と一層強固な国家安全政策の展開を可能にするために、第９条の解釈は「改め」なれなければならないと主張している。日本を効果的に防衛し、日本の安全保障にとっての要である日米安全保障条約を支持し、日本の安全保障につながる国際的な平和と安全保障に貢献するという戦略的に緊急性を要することがらを遂行するためにはこれが必要であるというのである。要するに報告書の主張するところは煎じつめればこうである。「日本はより多くの脅威にさらされている。したがって、第９条の意味は、われわれがこれらの脅威によりよく対処できるように変えられなければない」。

（このような）政治的分析は賞賛に値する。しかし、憲法的分析としては、このような主張は、不合理である。現在の（国際）状況が提起した諸問題を識別するところから始めて、（次に）これらの諸問題を解決するのに必要な政治的対応を決定することに移り、それからそのような政策を採用することを促すための憲法条項の解釈に終わるというアプローチそのものが全く不合理なのである。

いかなる憲法理論の定説においても、憲法の解釈は、ある特定の条項の結論や政治的な関連問題から出発し、次にその条項の意味を政治的に望ましい成果を実現できるようなやり方で反対向きに移っていくことはできない。そのような結果志向の論法は、明らかに説得力に欠ける。それどころか、報告書の中で主張されているところとは異なり、懇談会が行ったのはまさしくこのことなのである。

憲法は自国の基本的な法的枠組みを形成している。その諸条項は、将来の世代に対して、このようにつくられたシステムの制限内で、かつ憲法が具体化した価値や理想に従って行動することを義務付けている。ある憲法条項の意味は、その条項それ自体の正文を考慮し、その条項が達成するように企図されている目的を理解して決定しなければならない。そうしたプロセスを助けるものに、憲法の他の部分への考慮や憲法制定・批准の歴史がある。それらは、そのプロセスの中で書き上げられた法的諸原則が教えてくれる。

基本的な法原則を運用するにあたって、一貫性、安定性、予測可能性は、法治主義にとって決定的に重要であるから、その条項の裁判所や憲法上必要な権限を備えた統治機構によるその後の解釈や長年にわたるその運用もまた解釈のための重要な基準である。

憲法解釈については様々な理論がある。他のものに比べ、正本と憲法制定者意思により結合しているものもあるし、憲法は、裁判所における解釈の長年にわたる積み重ねを通して、また価値観の変動や国の現実状況に伴って徐々に発展する生きた制度であるということを強調する研究方法もある。しかし、認識された政治上の必要性に合わせるため、その場しのぎの極端な政府による条項再解釈を予定するような憲法解釈論は存在しない。

仮に、国の状況に重要な変化が、ある憲法の条項を継続して持ち続けることに疑義が生ずるほどのものになった場合には、適切な道は憲法を改正することである。状況の変化、さらには価値観の変化でさえも、明らかに予定されている。通常（憲法）改正手続きは憲法システムの一部分をなしている。日本国憲法に例外ではない。日本国憲法はドイツやアメリカ合衆国よりも簡単な改正手続きをもっているのである。

その場しのぎの「解釈」とりわけ行政府のその場しのぎの「解釈」は、まさしく正統な憲法改正手続きを回避する究極のやり方なのである。

もし国民の多数はそのような改正を支持しないだろうというのであれば、それは、国民の多数が賛同しない新しい意味を憲法に押し付けようとすることの不合理性を際立たせるだけである。そもそも、「状況が変わった。だから我々は憲法を変えなくてはならない」という議論は、まったく正当なものである。しかし「状況が変わった。だから憲法の意味は変わらなければならない」という議論は正当なものではない。

もし政府が状況の変化を理由に第９条を「再解釈」することが簡単にできるなら、ほかの条項ではなぜそれができないということになるのか。日本への移民の数が、高齢者の人口という難問に反応を示して増加するならば、政府はもはや外国人に対する差別を禁止するものではないとして、第１４条をも「再解釈」することができるのであろうか。いかなる条項の「再解釈」をも、憲法の構造全体を危機に陥れることになる。もちろん、裁判所は憲法を解釈する最終的な権威をもっている。しかし日本の最高裁判所は歴史的に、こうした状況では頼りにならないほど政府に敬意を示してきた。

アメリカ合衆国の銃の問題を考えてみよう。多数のアメリカ人やおそらく世界の他のほとんどの国の人々は、先進国の中で、最も殺人や暴力の発生率が高い国で、個人に小火器を保所持する権利を保障している憲法条項を持つということは、誤っていると考えている。その条項すなわち修正第２条は、２００年以上も前に批准されたものである。それは、多くの人々によって、時代錯誤であり、かつアメリカにおける銃という現代の社会悪を減らすための努力に対する重大な障害となっていると考えられている。

しかし、アメリカ合衆国大統領や連邦議会が、すべての小火器を法的に禁止することを可能にするために、修正第２条を「再解釈」するなどということは全く想像すらできないことである。そして、アメリカ合衆国憲法修正第２条は、日本国憲法第９条よりずっとあいまいであり、もっと複雑な歴史をもっている。最近コロンビア州自治区が最高裁判所の前で行ったように、妥当な憲法解釈の諸原則に基づいているならば、別の解釈の方が、より妥当なものとなる。しかし、アメリカでは銃があまりにも多くの人々を殺しているので、修正第２条はいまや何か別のものを意味するようになったと政府が簡単に主張することはできないのである。

柳井報告は、変化しつつある国際的な安全保障環境について重要な分析をしており、また日本の戦略的な政策の必要性について簡潔な表現で述べている。それは、日本が第９条の制約内で国家安全保障の目的に応えることができるかどうかという重要な疑問を提起している。

柳井報告はまた、憲法改正に賛成する立場に立って、提出するのが妥当な重要な議論を提供している。報告書はさらに、報告書が奨励している変化によって可能となる軍事力の行使を制約するために設けられるべき法的な限界について、かなり詳細かつ見事な勧告を行っている。報告書は政治的な文書としては、少なからぬ価値をもっている。

しかし、第９条が、このようにして長期にわたって確立してきた解釈とは異なる意味を持つべきだという報告書の結論は、まったく説得力に欠ける。懇談会は、その解釈論のいくつかの項目において、誤りをおかしている。しかし、アプローチ全体の非論理性は、これらの誤りを目立たなくさせている。

上述したように、柳井報告は、その政治的分析に価値がありうるとは言えても、憲法の意味に対していかなる影響力をもってはならない。そして報告書に従おうとする政府の試みは、問題とされなければないのである。

以上

（常岡せつ子教授翻訳）

The case in question, commonly known as the Sunakawa case, remains a highly important judgment of the Supreme Court, and the discovery that the U.S. government interfered in the process is important, and may have political repercussions in the ongoing constitutional revision debate.

The Telegram

The discovery itself was made by a Japanese historian on U.S. Japanese relations named Niihara Shoji. While doing research at the U.S. National Archives he uncovered a telegram from ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, nephew to the more famous general who was Senior Commander Allied Powers during the occupation of Japan. In the telegram, sent to Washington in April, 1959, ambassador MacArthur recounted his discussions with both foreign minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and with Supreme Court Chief Justice Tanaka Kotaro, regarding the ruling by the Tokyo District Court in March, 1959, that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was unconstitutional, and that the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in Japan was a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution.

The telegram explains that ambassador MacArthur had initially pressed foreign minister Fujiyama to ensure that the government would appeal the decision directly to the Supreme Court, by-passing the more normal procedure of appealing to the Tokyo High Court. According to the telegram, he “stressed importance of GOJ [government of Japan] taking speedy action to rectify ruling by Tokyo District Court”.

It also recounts how he then had private discussions with Chief Justice Tanaka, after the Supreme Court was seized of the case, in which he sought to determine when the Supreme Court would likely hand down its decision. While the telegram is apparently silent on the issue, it is difficult to believe that the ambassador would not have similarly conveyed to the Chief Justice the American view that it was essential to “rectify” the ruling of the court below.

Why the need for speed? How important a case was this? Why should this be viewed as being important now, some 48 years later?

The Context of the Sunakawa Case

First a few words on the case itself. It was a criminal trial involving the prosecution of several people for trespassing on the property of a U.S. forces base, which they had done in the course of demonstrations against the presence of U.S. forces in Japan and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty itself. They were prosecuted under a special law that carried a higher penalty for trespassing on U.S. forces property than the penalty provided for trespassing under the regular criminal law.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that it had been passed pursuant to and in support of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which they argued was in violation of Article 9 of the Constitution. Art. 9 prohibits the use of force and the maintenance in Japan of any land, sea, or air forces, or other war potential. The Tokyo District Court held that the U.S. forces in Japan constituted such armed forces and thus violated Art. 9, and that the treaty that required Japan to permit such maintenance of U.S. forces was similarly in violation of Art. 9.

The government of Kishi Nobusuke was in the midst of re-negotiating the treaty, and it was up for renewal in 1960. There were increasing protests and demonstrations against the treaty and the presence of U.S. forces, of which the accused in the case had been a part. The protests continued to mount in 1959, with strikes, student demonstrations, and even violent confrontations escalating as the year wore on. Meanwhile, in the midst of the Cold War, the U.S. government viewed the continued maintenance of substantial U.S. forces in Japan as crucial, and hence the need for speed in “rectifying” the decision of the lower court in this case.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Sunakawa case in December, 1959, on the very eve of the final conclusion of the renewed U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In comparison to normal timelines for Japanese litigation, to have a Supreme Court decision some 9 months after the decision of first instance represents unprecedented and blinding speed. Ten years is much more typical. This is significant in the context of considering the influence the U.S. government may indeed have had on the process.

The decision itself remains profoundly important in Japanese constitutional law. The Court overturned the decision of the Tokyo District Court, and remanded the case. Far more importantly, however, the Court engaged in an interpretation of Art. 9 for the first and only time in its history (before or since), and made a determination that continues to influence the institution of judicial review more generally.

The majority of the Court held that notwithstanding the apparent meaning of Art. 9 on its face, it did not preclude Japan from exercising individual self-defence, and it was open to Japan to establish agreements with other countries for the purpose of providing for its defence. Moreover, it held that since the U.S. forces were not under the command and control of the Japanese government, they did not constitute the maintenance by Japan of land, sea or air forces, or other war potential in violation of Art. 9.

But far more important, the real basis of the decision was that the question itself was not properly within the jurisdiction of the courts, because the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty had such a degree of “political consideration”, and thus the question of its constitutionality was too “political”, such that the courts could not make the determination and had to defer to the executive and legislative branches of government on the issue.

The Court came to this view notwithstanding that Art. 81 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the sole authority to interpret the Constitution and to determine the constitutionality of any law, regulation, or other act of government, and that Art. 98 of the Constitution provides that it is the supreme law of the land, and that no law, regulation, or other act of government that is inconsistent with it will have any force and effect.

The narrow question before the Court was whether the provisions of the treaty that required Japan to permit the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan were inconsistent with Art. 9(2) of the Constitution, such that the legislation passed to support such forces, were therefore invalid, and that was clearly a legal question. Yet the Court ducked it, and held that it was “too political” because it had ramifications that affected Japan’s international treaty obligations and its relationship with the U.S. As Justice Kotani wrote in an impassioned dissent (on the reasoning, not the result), in effect the Court was taking the position that any issue of significant importance was beyond its jurisdiction and should be deferred to the executive and legislative branches.

The Significance of the Decision

While the Supreme Court has never itself explicitly made recourse to this “political question” refuge (and it should be made clear that the reasoning behind it has little resemblance to the ‘political question doctrine’ employed in U.S. jurisprudence), the lower courts have repeatedly used it, often in the course of dismissing claims regarding Art. 9.

Thus, in my view, the Supreme Court judgment in the Sunakawa case not only operated to eviscerate the normative power of Art. 9, and thus helped to undermine the integrity of the Constitution, but it very badly damaged the power of the judiciary and the institution of judicial review itself. As Justice Kotani in dissent argued, the Court could have reached the same result, by simply finding that U.S. forces did not constitute the maintenance of forces by Japan, without going the additional step of depriving itself of jurisdiction to interpret the constitutionality of the treaty, or other politically important issues.

The Implications of the U.S. Interference

Now we discover that the U.S. government most improperly interfered in the process of the case. We still do not know the extent to which pressure was brought to bear on the Supreme Court of course, nor the extent to which it would have been susceptible to overt pressure from Americans in any event. But there is no question that the Court understood the difficulty of the position it was in, given that it was in a real sense being asked to issue a judgment that would require the government to either abrogate or violate its international treaty obligations on the one hand, or stand in violation of the Constitution in a manner that could not be remedied on the other.

The U.S. interference would have made the difficulty of this position all the apparent and poignant. And reflecting yet again the old saw that justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done, the discovery that the U.S. government was interfering with a Supreme Court deliberation on this most important of cases, may reverberate in the ongoing debate over constitutional revision.

The judgment, and how the government is responding to it, raises profoundly important issues. The case was one of dozens that have been commenced by citizen groups in opposition to the deployment of the SDF in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is the first decision that has held that the operations are unconstitutional, and it is the most important decision involving Art. 9 to be handed down by a court in over 25 years. Below I provide more of the background and the reasoning of the decision, but first, I address the main issues it raises.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims both for damages in respect of their right to live in peace, and for the injunction against continued deployment of the ASDF. The plaintiffs were found not to have a direct legal interest that would be harmed by the ASDF operations. While finding that the deployment in Iraq was a violation of the prohibition on the use of force in Art. 9 of the Constitution, it held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to claim a remedy for that violation. It was, therefore, a win for the government in terms of the specific demands of plaintiffs. Yet it was a major set-back for the government in terms of its policy having been judged as being unconstitutional.

Representatives of the government, including the prime minister, have not only made statements to the effect that the judgment will not change any aspect of government policy, but are rejecting the validity of the decision. Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura stated that “I cannot accept such a court ruling when the Japanese government has determined that [Baghdad airport] is a non-combat zone.” The court found as a matter of both fact and law, on the basis of the evidence before it and its interpretation of the definition of “combat area” in the Iraq Special Measures Law, that Baghdad was a combat zone.

Even Adm. Saito, Chief of Staff of the SDF, commented that “the ASDF mission does not play an integral part in the use of force”. This was a direct contradiction of the finding of the Court, which held that the ASDF transportation of armed coalition forces in order to assist in their participation in armed conflict, made the ASDF activity necessary for and integral to the overall use of force by coalition forces.

The primary issues that arise from this, in my view, are:

1) The rule of law and division of powers – notwithstanding the dismissal of the specific claims, an appellate court has held that government activity is a violation of a provision that forms one of the three fundamental pillars of Japan’s constitutional order. If the government continues to treat the judgment as irrelevant, and its representatives continue to make statements that fundamentally reject the findings of the court, what does that say about the rule of law in Japan? What will be the impact on the authority of the courts, and the balance of power among the three branches of government? That the senior military officer in the SDF could be allowed to publicly contradict and reject a judgment of a high court, is extraordinary.

2) The further emasculation of the Constitution – Not unrelated to the first issue, is the continued erosion of the normative power of constitution, both by continued judicial narrowing of the standing required to seek enforceent of the Constitution, and by continued government rejection of judicial interpretations of the Constitution. While the Nagoya High Court speculated that there could be circumstances in which citizens might be able to advance a claim for the violation of Art. 9, the reality is that given the requirement to demonstrate direct and concrete harm to a narrow legal interest, there are few scenarios in which citizens may actually seek judicial review of executive action in violation of Art. 9. Where the government is allowed to further ignore and treat with contempt the decisions of courts wherein it is held that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ lack of standing, government action is in violation of the Constitution, then entire provisions of the Constitution become practically unenforceable and of little or no normative content. This was similarly illustrated in last year’s Yasukuni Shrine decision of the Supreme Court.

Background and the Judgment

The operations in Iraq were authorized by the Iraq Special Measures Law (Law No. 137 of 2003), which provided that the SDF could be deployed to provide humanitarian and reconstruction support to coalition forces in Iraq.

The law was passed after official hostilities had been declared at an end, and the period of belligerent occupation authorized by the U.N. Security Council had begun. The law very specifically limited SDF activity to areas of Iraq where combat was not taking place and was not expected to take place, and it defined combat as acts of killing and injuring, or destroying of property, in the context of international armed conflict (Art.2(3)). Japan deployed some 600 members of the GSDF to the South of Iraq until 2006, but continues to deploy ASDF elements, principally C-130 Hercules aircraft, for the transporting of supplies and coalition forces between Kuwait and Iraq, and between cities within Iraq.

Law suites challenged the law and the deployment of the SDF on the basis that the involvement in Iraq constituted the use of force in violation of Art. 9(1) of the Constitution, which reads in part: “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”. The over 1,100 plaintiffs in the Nagoya case also alleged that the SDF forces sent to Iraq were operating in a combat zone, in violation of the Iraq Special Measures Law, arguing that this further enforced the inference that their activity constituted the use of force.

The district court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs on the usual ground that they did not have standing, since they could not demonstrate that they had the kind of direct legal interest that would be harmed by the deployment. The plaintiffs had, as is standard in all such cases, claimed damages for the psychological harm that was caused by the infringement of their right to live in peace, but the court rejected the argument. This was in line with the decision in the famous Naganuma case in 1982, which held that the most narrow and direct individual legal interests had to be implicated by the state action in order for plaintiffs to have standing to advance claims of constitutional violation.

The Nagoya High Court confirmed that decision, holding that while the plaintiffs did indeed have a right to live in peace, a right that arose from Art. 9, the deployment of the SDF to Iraq did not cause any direct harm to the plaintiffs’ specific legal interests. They therefore did not have the standing to sue for either damages or an injunction. Notwithstanding that decision, however, the Court, presided over by Justice Aoyama (who I understand is very soon to retire, and so this was one of his last judgments) first held that deployment of the SDF to Iraq, and particularly the current operations of the ASDF in transporting supplies and armed coalition forces from Kuwait to such areas in Iraq as Baghdad, constituted the use of force and was thus a violation of Art. 9(1).

The Court held that Baghdad was certainly a combat zone, given the ongoing hostilities among various militia and insurgent groups, and between such groups and coalition forces. Representatives of the Ministry of Defence gave testimony that Baghdad airport itself, while tightly defended by U.S. forces, was susceptible to attack. Flying troops and supplies into such a combat zone clearly violated the Iraq Special Measures Law, and constituted participation in the use of force in violation of Art. 9(1). The Court explained that the transporting of armed troops to combat zones, troops that were involved in the use of armed force and were being transported for the purpose of engaging in combat, made Japan activity integral to and necessary for the use of force by coalition forces. The activity thus constituted the use of force by Japan, in clear violation of the prohibition in Art. 9(1) of the Constitution.

As an aside, the decision is not yet officially available anywhere that I can find on the internet. It is not yet on the public court hanrei database site, nor is it available through the Lex/DB subscription service. Fortunately, the plaintiffs posted a copy on their litigation homepage – here.

As the debate continues in Japan’s Diet this month over a new Antiterrorism Special Measures Law (ASM Law) authorizing Japanese naval force activities in the Indian Ocean, serious attention must be paid to the issues of exactly how such activity is to be limited, and how the Diet can meaningfully monitor compliance with such limitations.

These are not simply political or operational issues, but constitutional issues.

The current draft of the ASM Law purports to authorize the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to supply fuel to coalition forces engaged in maritime interdiction operations related to Afghanistan. The law would restrict, among other things, the MSDF’s area of operations, its involvement in any use of force, and the purpose for which the fuel it provides may be used. These limitations have been explained as being necessary to ensure that Article 9 of the Constitution is not violated.

Yet the U.S. government has recently made clear that it will not agree to respect any limitations that Japanese law may seek to impose on the use of fuel provided by the MSDF.

From the U.S. perspective, Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.N.-authorized ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. operations in Iraq, and, for that matter, potential activities in other areas in the region, are all part of a broader campaign, and U.S. naval assets are not dedicated exclusively to any one operation. Operational flexibility is paramount.

The Japanese government has been desperate since November to renew its contribution to U.S. efforts, and may feel the pressure now to agree to ill-defined or legally ambiguous naval operations. Canada went through a similar process in 2003.

In February 2003, Canada assumed command of a multinational naval task force — TF 151 — operating near the Persian Gulf in support of operations in Afghanistan. The Canadian Department of National Defense (DND) had agreed to take command on the assumption that Canada would likely participate in the looming invasion of Iraq.

The Canadian government decided in March 2003, however, not to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but it was clear by then that TF 151 would be involved in support of operations relating to both Afghanistan and Iraq.

This created an enormous dilemma for Canada. The DND was of the view that it could not continue in command of TF 151 under such circumstances. It had internal legal opinions that concluded that any Canadian participation in maritime interdiction operations related to the war in Iraq would make Canada a belligerent in that war under international law, regardless of what position the government adopted publicly.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was opposed to Canada relinquishing command of TF 151, fearing that doing so would further antagonize Canada’s most important ally. The prime minister went along with Foreign Affairs, and publicly stated that Canada’s naval forces would continue to operate in TF 151, but only with respect to the operations in Afghanistan.

This was possible for some countries in the task force, as their ships were assigned to sectors far removed from Iraq. But in practical terms, this was impossible for Canada, as it was exercising command of the task force, and the task force as a whole could not be so limited. In practice, Canada continued with a “double-hatted” operation (serving two mandates simultaneously), but one mandate was in respect of a war that Canada had publicly refused to join and whose legality Canada had publicly questioned.

Canada continued in command of TF 151 until June 2003. It is still not known to what extent Canadian forces were involved in operations relating to Iraq. It was only due to extreme good fortune that Canada was saved from potential legal and public relations nightmares arising from direct engagement with Iraqi assets or the detention of high-profile Iraqi officials during that period.

Canada was actually engaged in interdiction operations — not merely logistical support — but then again Canada has no constitutional constraints on its involvement in the use of force either.

Notwithstanding these differences, Japan can take some lessons from the Canadian experience. For one, it should be recognized that many naval operations in the region are “double-hatted.” More importantly, Canada got into a legally untenable situation primarily due to a perceived need to satisfy its American ally, which made no distinctions between operations in support of Afghanistan and those in support of war in Iraq.

In practical and legal terms, Canada’s conduct was inconsistent with its public political posture. It was lucky to have avoided any serious embarrassment, but then the integrity of its constitution was not at stake either. Finally, political monitoring for compliance with the public position was difficult.

In Japan there have already been incidents of the MSDF providing false information to politicians regarding its fueling operations in the Indian Ocean, leading to members of Cabinet making false statements to the public about the nature of Japan’s military involvement in so-called antiterrorism operations.

Yet the current ASM Law has less Diet oversight and control over the MSDF than the previous one. Without specific legal requirements, oversight and control of operations will be difficult. But consider the effect if it were later disclosed that the MSDF had supplied U.S. ships that were shortly thereafter involved in strikes on “terrorist sites” in northern Pakistan, or engagements with Iranian vessels.

To the extent that the Japanese government and people believe that support for military activity other than maritime interdiction operations related to Afghanistan could violate Article 9 of the Constitution, then the new ASM Law ought to contain clear limitations to that effect, and provide clear and effective mechanisms for the Diet to monitor MSDF operations to ensure compliance.

Moreover, the new ASM Law ought to specify that the MSDF may only supply fuel to those coalition countries that formally agree to limit their use of such supply for those purposes.

Several coalition nations have limited their naval forces to support for operations relating to Afghanistan. Japan’s efforts are in support of NATO as a whole, and if the United States finds such limitations overly restrictive for its own operational effectiveness, it will nonetheless benefit from Japanese supply to other NATO forces.

On the other hand, if such limitations are determined to be truly unworkable from an operational perspective, then Japan needs to rethink whether it can provide the logistical support requested. But Japan cannot allow itself to slide into a legally ambiguous situation that could result in a violation of a core principle in its Constitution, merely to accommodate the operational flexibility requirements of the U.S. Navy.