President Obama, in accepting his Nobel Prize, spoke in lofty terms about the requirement that all nations, weak and strong, must adhere to the legal standards that govern the use of force. He noted that the U.S. had played a leading role in creating that legal framework. And he went on to underline that the U.S. too must respect international law: “America cannot insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves. For when we don’t, our action can appear arbitrary, and undercut the legitimacy of future intervention — no matter how justified.”

And yet the absence of any public discussion or analysis of the legal issues raised by America’s efforts against terrorism is striking. Whether it be torture and extraordinary rendition, military commissions, the targeted killing by drone attacks in Pakistan, the planning of CIA assassination squads, the large number of civilian deaths in air strikes in Afghanistan, or even the prospect of military strikes in Iran, all of these raise significant and complex international law issues. But you will not find any meaningful discussion of those issues in the media, or indeed in the talking points, blogs, or analysis produced by most liberal or progressive organizations.

Consider the contrast between the media coverage of such topics and the analysis of the issues surrounding the Israeli operations in Gaza earlier this year. There were countless articles examining the legal significance of the claims that the Israeli use of force was disproportionate, that civilians and civilian structures had been targeted, and that Israeli forces were using illegitimate munitions. The coverage was often sympathetic to the Israeli position, but there was nonetheless an examination of the legal issues involved. In contrast, when in the same month American forces killed Afghani civilians in air strikes, there was no such analysis – the entire discussion revolved around the strategic and political ramifications of killing civilians.

Liberal advocates say in private that they did not want to raise the international law arguments against torture, because such arguments “do not play well” in middle America. So the focus of the debate in this country was on the ineffectiveness of torture, and how counterproductive it could be. That is a dangerous argument to stake one’s entire position on. The fact is that the prohibition of torture is one of the very few peremptory norms in international law (known as jus cogens norms) – meaning it is one of the most bedrock principles of international law that nations may not derogate from under any circumstance. The other such norms include the prohibitions on slavery, genocide, and piracy. Yet in America, the debate was over when and under what circumstances we might derogate from the norm, and liberals were afraid to raise the law, because it does not “play well.”

The danger in all of this is that if liberals and progressives are afraid to make the argument for international law and the rule of law, then the argument will not get made. Progressives, afraid of looking weak, abandon the defense of the rule of law in favor of functional arguments. And so the country lurches ever rightward, in a one-way ratchet effect, with crucial principles being left by the side of the road as political liabilities.
Yet this country is supposed to be a “nation of laws” that preaches to the world the importance of the rule of law. These principles are supposed to be foundational, part of the constitutional DNA of the nation. They are part of the identity that is presented to the rest of the world. It cannot reject international law without doing violence to its own notions of the importance of law and the rule of law.

Moreover, as President Obama said, if the U.S. does not respect and observe the international legal standards, then it will lose its legitimacy and moral authority in the world. And that means that the extent to which American policy conforms to international law, from military commissions to targeted killings in Pakistan, must be part of the national discourse. So progressives have to engage the legal issues more, both to help preserve the country’s identity as a nation of laws, and to help ensure that we at least understand whether policy complies with the law.

Once again the issue of Japanese contributions to international security efforts is the subject of tortured debate. And once again the proposed government policy, and aspects of the debate itself, reveals fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between Article 9 of the Constitution and the relevant principles of international law.

This time, the issue relates to maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the proposed deployment of Japanese naval vessels to the area. Predictably, the issue has triggered debate over the effect of the war-renouncing provision of the Constitution. A careful analysis, however, would suggest that the Article 9 prohibition on the use of force would not apply to the deployment of naval forces, or their use of weapons, to protect shipping from pirates in international waters.

Yet, it is clear that the government policy is being formulated under the shadow of Article 9. While the ships are initially being deployed under the authority of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the government has drafted and submitted to the Diet a permanent anti-piracy law, and it is around this bill that debate has focused.

Opposition to the bill has centered on questions of whether the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessels would be permitted to assist foreign ships, what degree of relationship with Japan would be necessary to justify MSDF intervention and under what circumstances weapons could be employed against pirates.

This is quite clearly due to the influence of the government interpretation of Article 9 as prohibiting any use of force by Japan except for the purposes of “individual self-defense” — meaning the direct defense of Japan. Similarly, the opposition to the policy is being shaped by Article 9.

The criticism is that any use of force by the MSDF to defend ships of other nations would somehow constitute “collective self-defense,” which is understood to be prohibited by Article 9. Similarly, it is argued that any use of weapons for purposes other than strict self-defense would be prima facie illegitimate.

But these concerns fail to consider the true nature of the prohibition in Article 9. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 states (in part) that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”

The words “as a means of settling international disputes” qualify and limit the scope of the prohibition. The provision does not purport to prohibit the use of force of any kind whatsoever by the organs of the state. For instance, it clearly does not prohibit the use of force for ensuring internal security, and the Japanese police can legally use force to break up riots or armed insurrections.

The language and the drafting history of the provision clearly suggest that it was aimed at prohibiting participation in armed conflict, principally with other sovereign nations, as a means of furthering the foreign policy of the state and resolving disputes with or between other nation states. In short, the use of force contemplated by the provision is the use of military force employed against the territory and people, and the armed forces or other agents, of another state.

So the question then, is whether the deployment of the MSDF, and the possible use of armed force by the MSDF, to help prevent piracy in the Gulf of Aden, falls within the scope of this constitutional prohibition of the use of force. To answer that question, one has to understand the concept of “piracy” in international law.

Piracy has been an international crime under the Law of Nations for several centuries. The prohibition of piracy under international law is generally understood to have risen to the level of jus cogens (compelling law), meaning that it is one of the few peremptory norms from which no country may derogate.

The International Court of Justice has confirmed that pirates are to be considered the enemy of all mankind, and that any nation may, in the interest of the entire world, capture and punish those engaged in piracy.

Piracy, under most generally accepted definitions, constitutes illegal acts of violence or any other act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew of a private ship (or aircraft), that is directed against another ship (or aircraft) on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.

The key elements of this definition are that it is a criminal act, perpetrated by private individuals for personal ends, outside of the jurisdiction of any state (which, incidentally, is quite different from non-state actors engaged in terrorism, a quintessentially political activity, typically conducted within the jurisdiction of a state, and often supported or harbored in another state).

Any use of force against pirates in international waters, either to defend private shipping from their attacks or even to apprehend them and bring them to justice, cannot be construed as a use of military force for the purpose of settling international disputes. Such action does not involve the application of force against the agents of another state, the engagement in armed conflict with the forces of another state, or any other act of war. The laws of war under international law would not be triggered by the use of force against pirates, and it would not apply to such conduct.

In short, such use of force against pirates, in international waters, cannot fall within the scope of the prohibition in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Now, to be sure, the MSDF would have to take care that the target of their activity legitimately fell within the definition of “pirates,” and that they were in international waters. Conducting activities in the territorial waters or on the shores of Somalia, for instance, would raise entirely different issues.

In the past, failure to sufficiently understand the applicable international law, and the relationship between such principles of international law and the proper interpretation of Article 9, has resulted in Japanese participation in international military operations that arguably violated the Constitution.

It may be understandable, therefore, that some in Japan will be apprehensive that the deployment of the military for any reason may open the door to further unconstitutional activity. And, indeed, there is a real and significant risk that such deployments of the military could be used cynically by the government to undermine the powerful norms within Japan against the use of military force.

Those concerned about this risk may be tempted in these circumstances to invoke the Constitution as a bar against the deployment against pirates. But that would be dangerously counterproductive. It would simply contribute to a process in which political forces exploit constitutional arguments for instrumentalist purposes, whether they be cynical or benign, leading to confusion and disagreement over the meaning of the Constitution, and the overall weakening of its authority.

There may be room for debate over the wisdom of deploying naval forces to defend against pirates on the high seas. The Constitution should not be part of that debate. One of the key defenses against government infringement of the actual constitutional principles is to ensure that the scope and meaning of the principles remain clearly understood and widely shared. And the government ought to ensure the integrity of the Constitution by applying its provisions consistently, and in accordance with that understanding, in the shaping of national policy.

第９条の新解釈を押し付けようとすることの致命的な欠陥

一般に柳井報告として知られている「安全保障の法的基盤の再構築に関する懇談会」報告は、日本が集団的自衛および集団安全保障活動に参加することを可能にするためには、日本国憲法第９条の再解釈が必要であると主張している。現在は、いずれの活動も、第９条第１項で禁止されていると解されている。しかし、この報告書は、懇談会の分析の正当性を根底から覆す根本的欠陥を明らかにしている。

懇談会は2007年4月に、安倍晋三内閣（当時）によって、憲法の「再解釈」の必要性を検討するために設置された。懇談会は、13人の著名な学者、元外交官、その大部分は国際関係、政治、国家安全保障の専門家である官僚たちで構成されたていた。懇談会のメンバーの中に憲法学者は一人しかいなかった。懇談会は、憲法改正に賛成していることが公に知られているタカ派によって占められていると批判された。座長の柳井俊二は、元アメリカ大使であり、現在は中央大学教授であるが、6月に内閣に懇談会報告を提出した。

当時の福田康夫首相は、この報告書すなわち憲法の「再解釈」にはほとんど興味を示さなかった。しかし麻生首相は、第９条は「再解釈」されなければならないと、国連で繰り返し述べた。さらに柳井報告書が、官僚たちの間で歓迎され、政府内において次第に影響力を行使しそうな証拠がある。したがってこの報告書は、もっと公に吟味の対象とならなければならないのである。

この報告書は、冷戦終結以降、日本および国際社会には脅威が増大し、脅威の種類も様々になって国際的な安全保障の環境が変化したため、これまで確立されてきた憲法の解釈は、もはや適切ではないと主張している。むしろ、９条は重要な安全保障の目的の遂行を妨げているというのである。

このように、この報告書は、一層効果的な防衛力と一層強固な国家安全政策の展開を可能にするために、第９条の解釈は「改め」なれなければならないと主張している。日本を効果的に防衛し、日本の安全保障にとっての要である日米安全保障条約を支持し、日本の安全保障につながる国際的な平和と安全保障に貢献するという戦略的に緊急性を要することがらを遂行するためにはこれが必要であるというのである。要するに報告書の主張するところは煎じつめればこうである。「日本はより多くの脅威にさらされている。したがって、第９条の意味は、われわれがこれらの脅威によりよく対処できるように変えられなければない」。

（このような）政治的分析は賞賛に値する。しかし、憲法的分析としては、このような主張は、不合理である。現在の（国際）状況が提起した諸問題を識別するところから始めて、（次に）これらの諸問題を解決するのに必要な政治的対応を決定することに移り、それからそのような政策を採用することを促すための憲法条項の解釈に終わるというアプローチそのものが全く不合理なのである。

いかなる憲法理論の定説においても、憲法の解釈は、ある特定の条項の結論や政治的な関連問題から出発し、次にその条項の意味を政治的に望ましい成果を実現できるようなやり方で反対向きに移っていくことはできない。そのような結果志向の論法は、明らかに説得力に欠ける。それどころか、報告書の中で主張されているところとは異なり、懇談会が行ったのはまさしくこのことなのである。

憲法は自国の基本的な法的枠組みを形成している。その諸条項は、将来の世代に対して、このようにつくられたシステムの制限内で、かつ憲法が具体化した価値や理想に従って行動することを義務付けている。ある憲法条項の意味は、その条項それ自体の正文を考慮し、その条項が達成するように企図されている目的を理解して決定しなければならない。そうしたプロセスを助けるものに、憲法の他の部分への考慮や憲法制定・批准の歴史がある。それらは、そのプロセスの中で書き上げられた法的諸原則が教えてくれる。

基本的な法原則を運用するにあたって、一貫性、安定性、予測可能性は、法治主義にとって決定的に重要であるから、その条項の裁判所や憲法上必要な権限を備えた統治機構によるその後の解釈や長年にわたるその運用もまた解釈のための重要な基準である。

憲法解釈については様々な理論がある。他のものに比べ、正本と憲法制定者意思により結合しているものもあるし、憲法は、裁判所における解釈の長年にわたる積み重ねを通して、また価値観の変動や国の現実状況に伴って徐々に発展する生きた制度であるということを強調する研究方法もある。しかし、認識された政治上の必要性に合わせるため、その場しのぎの極端な政府による条項再解釈を予定するような憲法解釈論は存在しない。

仮に、国の状況に重要な変化が、ある憲法の条項を継続して持ち続けることに疑義が生ずるほどのものになった場合には、適切な道は憲法を改正することである。状況の変化、さらには価値観の変化でさえも、明らかに予定されている。通常（憲法）改正手続きは憲法システムの一部分をなしている。日本国憲法に例外ではない。日本国憲法はドイツやアメリカ合衆国よりも簡単な改正手続きをもっているのである。

その場しのぎの「解釈」とりわけ行政府のその場しのぎの「解釈」は、まさしく正統な憲法改正手続きを回避する究極のやり方なのである。

もし国民の多数はそのような改正を支持しないだろうというのであれば、それは、国民の多数が賛同しない新しい意味を憲法に押し付けようとすることの不合理性を際立たせるだけである。そもそも、「状況が変わった。だから我々は憲法を変えなくてはならない」という議論は、まったく正当なものである。しかし「状況が変わった。だから憲法の意味は変わらなければならない」という議論は正当なものではない。

もし政府が状況の変化を理由に第９条を「再解釈」することが簡単にできるなら、ほかの条項ではなぜそれができないということになるのか。日本への移民の数が、高齢者の人口という難問に反応を示して増加するならば、政府はもはや外国人に対する差別を禁止するものではないとして、第１４条をも「再解釈」することができるのであろうか。いかなる条項の「再解釈」をも、憲法の構造全体を危機に陥れることになる。もちろん、裁判所は憲法を解釈する最終的な権威をもっている。しかし日本の最高裁判所は歴史的に、こうした状況では頼りにならないほど政府に敬意を示してきた。

アメリカ合衆国の銃の問題を考えてみよう。多数のアメリカ人やおそらく世界の他のほとんどの国の人々は、先進国の中で、最も殺人や暴力の発生率が高い国で、個人に小火器を保所持する権利を保障している憲法条項を持つということは、誤っていると考えている。その条項すなわち修正第２条は、２００年以上も前に批准されたものである。それは、多くの人々によって、時代錯誤であり、かつアメリカにおける銃という現代の社会悪を減らすための努力に対する重大な障害となっていると考えられている。

しかし、アメリカ合衆国大統領や連邦議会が、すべての小火器を法的に禁止することを可能にするために、修正第２条を「再解釈」するなどということは全く想像すらできないことである。そして、アメリカ合衆国憲法修正第２条は、日本国憲法第９条よりずっとあいまいであり、もっと複雑な歴史をもっている。最近コロンビア州自治区が最高裁判所の前で行ったように、妥当な憲法解釈の諸原則に基づいているならば、別の解釈の方が、より妥当なものとなる。しかし、アメリカでは銃があまりにも多くの人々を殺しているので、修正第２条はいまや何か別のものを意味するようになったと政府が簡単に主張することはできないのである。

柳井報告は、変化しつつある国際的な安全保障環境について重要な分析をしており、また日本の戦略的な政策の必要性について簡潔な表現で述べている。それは、日本が第９条の制約内で国家安全保障の目的に応えることができるかどうかという重要な疑問を提起している。

柳井報告はまた、憲法改正に賛成する立場に立って、提出するのが妥当な重要な議論を提供している。報告書はさらに、報告書が奨励している変化によって可能となる軍事力の行使を制約するために設けられるべき法的な限界について、かなり詳細かつ見事な勧告を行っている。報告書は政治的な文書としては、少なからぬ価値をもっている。

しかし、第９条が、このようにして長期にわたって確立してきた解釈とは異なる意味を持つべきだという報告書の結論は、まったく説得力に欠ける。懇談会は、その解釈論のいくつかの項目において、誤りをおかしている。しかし、アプローチ全体の非論理性は、これらの誤りを目立たなくさせている。

上述したように、柳井報告は、その政治的分析に価値がありうるとは言えても、憲法の意味に対していかなる影響力をもってはならない。そして報告書に従おうとする政府の試みは、問題とされなければないのである。

以上

（常岡せつ子教授翻訳）

Several blog posts have noted the lack of mainstream discussion on the legality of this missile strike. Prof. Marty Lederman, writing in Slate, suggested that few seem to care whether it was legal. But even among the bloggers, the majority of posts I have seen, as in the case of Prof. Lederman’s, have focused primarily on the constitutional issues of whether the President had sufficient authority, explicit or otherwise, to launch such attacks. There has been some discussion of the jus in bello issues, such as whether the strikes met the criteria of military necessity and proportionality, given the apparent collateral damage. But few have addressed the jus ad bellum issues – was this missile strike, and those prior to it (there have been several such attacks on Somalia since 2006) lawful under the international laws on the use of armed force?

Developments in jus ad bellum?

Prof. Jullian Ku was one of few that has raised the issue, on Opinio Juris, but he merely floated the idea that since such strikes have met with little objection, they may be evidence that the U.S. is operating in a legal paradigm that approximates that of war. Implicit in this is the proposition that there have been developments in international law on the use of force since 9/11 that permit one to wage war on organizations, and which give the global “war on terror” a legal foundation that would permit such strikes against Al Qaeda operatives at large in a “failed state”.

As I commented on his post over at Opinio Juris, I question whether the fact that there has been little formal objection to the strike can be said to support the inference that the strikes were therefore lawful or justifiable under international law, or that it reflects developments in international law that permit such strikes.

The prohibition on the use of force

Under the traditional understanding of jus ad bellum the strikes would appear to constitute a use of force in violation of Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits states from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, or in any other manner that is inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.

Prof. Lederman questioned whether the strikes might fall outside of the scope of this prohibition, given that it was not really aimed at Somalia per se, but rather at terrorists operating within Somalia. It seems very unlikely that this distinction could negate the application of Art. 2(4). If Mexico fired missiles into Texas to take out some alleged narco-terrorists there, the U.S. would no doubt rightly perceive it to be a violation of its territorial integrity and an armed attack in violation of its sovereignty, inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.

The right to self-defence

In interpreting Art. 2(4), one also needs to consider the operation of Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that member states have an inherent right to exercise individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack. Missile strikes aimed at targets within one’s territory would most certainly constitute such an armed attack and provide a state with the legal justification of responding with force in self-defence.

The missile strikes on Somalia would constitute such armed attacks justifying the right to the exercise of self-defence, and the fact that Somalia is in a state of political disarray, and able neither to effectively object or to mount any sort of self-defence, does not alter the legal analysis. That in turn informs the question of whether such armed attacks, which would justify self-defence, constitute an unlawful use of force in violation of Art. 2(4).

Continued exercise of self-defence?

Of course, attacks that are themselves conducted as part of the exercise of self-defence cannot constitute unlawful acts of aggression. Can it be said that the strikes on Somalia are part of a continued American exercise of the right of self-defence as against Al Qaeda in response to the 9/11 attacks? This brings one back to the issue of whether international law recognizes armed conflict at large against non-state terrorist organizations.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was based on the Art. 51 right of self-defence, but was understood to be against the state of Afghanistan for its harbouring of the terrorists who conducted the attack. Notwithstanding the continued inusurgency in Afghanistan today, the initial invasion and occupation of Afghanistan ended years ago. Has there been some development of international law that permits states to employ military force rising to the level of armed attacks against third states on the basis that enemies from a former conflict have now taken refuge there?

The war on terror and jus ad bellum

The constant refrain that the U.S. is engaged in a so-called “war on terror” does not advance the analysis. An effort against terrorism in and of itself does not come within the definitions of international armed conflict in international law, nor do many aspects of that effort trigger the application of the laws of war. What is hte legal development that provides a legal justification for military strikes on countries in which the operative of an organization defined as “the enemny” may be residing at any given time?

A hypothetical may help us draw the distinction between the so-called criminal law paradigm and laws-of-war paradigm into stark relief. Consider a case where an alleged Al Qaeda operative is found to be residing in Canada. The U.S. requests of the Canadian government that he be apprehended. The Canadian government, however, approaching the issue from the criminal law paradigm, advises Washington that it has insufficient evidence to apprehend or detain him under the criminal laws of Canada (which now include a number of enhanced terrorism-targeting provisions). May the U.S., under the cloak of the war-paradigm of the so-called “war on terror”, and with assertions that Canada is now “harbouring terrorists”, fire cruise missiles into the apartment building where the Al Qaeda operative is holed up?

For those who argue that the “war on terror” is really an activity to which the laws of war apply, and that international law with respect to jus ad bellum has somehow changed since 9/11, the burden is on them to actually describe how, precisely, that is so.

This is not to say that the strikes were unlawful, but rather to emphasize that the questions raised by strikes such as those on Somalia certainly require much greater study and discussion. Their lawfulness ought not to be presumed. The foregoing review merely scratches the surface of the issues, and the questions should be getting more attention in both the mainstream media and in the academy.

An article in The New York Times on Sunday described how recent letters to Congress from the Department of Justice (DoJ) explain that the government reserves the right to decide on a case-by-case basis what interrogation methods would violate international law standards against mistreatment of detainees. Specifically, the letters from the DoJ state that where harsher interrogation measures are “undertaken to prevent a threatened terrorist attack, rather than for the purpose of humiliation or abuse” then such measures could be determined to be not “outrageous” or otherwise in violation of international standards.

In these letters the the government has focused on the language of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which among other things prohibits “outrages upon the personal dignity” of detainees. President Bush issued an executive order Executive Order in July, 2007, which provided that the CIA would comply with specified domestic and international standards against harsh treatment of detainees, with particular reference to Common Article 3. Why the letters do not refer to the standards of the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as they have been implemented in U.S. law and incorporated in that form into the Executive Order, is somewhat mystifying.

In any event, the letters explain that for treatment “to rise to the level of an outrage” so as to be in violation of international standards, it “must be so deplorable that the reasonable observer would recognize it as something that should be universally condemned”. Prof. Sandy Levinson has already written a nice piece illustrating the tautological paradox inherent in that statement. An ex ante determination by the government that the conduct is permissible would strongly militate against observations that the conduct is, or even ought to be, “universally” condemned.

But the Supreme Court of Israel has already dealt with this issue of ex ante authority for harsher interrogation techniques (and the techniques, as described in the judgment, are far far less harsh than those the CIA is suspected of using today). The Court recognized the security needs of the state, and even examined the old ticking time bomb hypothetical, but it concluded that the government could find no ex ante authority for harsher interrogation practices in the principle of necessity (its full judgment is here). It left open the possibility of the legislature passing laws providing specific authority for such measures, though it noted that democracies have to fight with one hand tied behind their backs in order not to violate their own fundamental values. It also left open the ex post facto raising of necessity as a defence in the event of criminal prosecution. But it could not rely on its own determinations of neccessity to justify, and provide immunity for, harsher interrogation techniques.

That Israel, a country with much greater existential threats, and very real and persistent terrorist attacks upon its territory, can respond so forcefully to government claims that “necessity” requires ex ante authority for harsher interrogation techniques, should be instructive for the purposes of the debate in the U.S.