Tomorrow, parliament will debate whether to extend the participation of the Canadian Forces in the NATO operations in Libya. First, it should be said that parliamentary approval of the operation is essential. Legislative oversight of the executive’s decisions to go to war is crucial for both democratic accountability and for reducing the likelihood of involvement in unwise or illegitimate adventures.

Canada is one of the few liberal democracies that does not have a constitutional or legislative requirement for such approval, but tomorrow’s debate is part of an increasingly established practice in Canada of parliamentary involvement in decisions to engage in armed conflict.

In order to make the debate meaningful, however, parliament must take seriously the issues before it. Members have a duty to rigorously interrogate the government’s motives, and to question the rationales advanced for continued involvement in the conflict. It is not enough to accept platitudes and vague assertions about Canada’s duties as an ally. Rather, there must be hard questions asked about the continued legitimacy of the operation, what exactly the objectives are, and how precisely our involvement advances the national interest or is consistent with our national values.

It should be recalled that the initial objective of NATO’s operation was to prevent a pending humanitarian disaster, when Libyan armed forces were poised to take Benghazi. The United Nations Security Council authorized, in Resolution 1973, the use of force to impose a no-fly zone, and to take all necessary measures to protect civilians. It was a classic humanitarian intervention, with the explicit objective of, and authority limited to, protecting civilians.President Obama and Secretary Clinton on numerous occasions stated that while the political objectives included the facilitation of a transition to a new government, for which reason Colonel Gaddafi had to leave, the military objectives of the intervention was strictly limited to the protection of civilian populations under threat from Gadaffi’s forces.

The objectives of NATO have clearly evolved. In classic “mission creep,” the operations now are obviously aimed at driving Gaddafi out. Last week NATO, with Canadian air force participation, again bombed Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli, which cannot be explained as being related to the protection of civilians.

The Canadian government’s objectives are just as clearly aligned with this new goal of enforcing regime change. Defence Minister Peter MacKay has suggested that Gaddafi’s departure is necessary to the goal of protecting civilians. While it is patently not true that killing or exiling Gaddafi is necessary for the protection of civilians in Libya, the statement reflects an acknowledgment that forcing Gaddafi out is now the stated goal of the Canadian government.

Members of parliament need to clearly understand, for the purposes of tomorrow’s debate, that this objective of regime change is illegitimate and unlawful. The Security Council Resolution very explicitly limits the authority for the use of force to the establishment of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians. At the urging of Arab League members of the Council, it even quite explicitly excludes any foreign occupation force in any part of Libya, in contemplation of any attempted foreign-imposed regime change.

As NATO operations increasingly extend beyond the narrow mandate of protecting civilians from immediate threats, they are moving outside of the legal authority provided by the Security Council. Under international law the use of armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state is prohibited, unless it is for the purposes of self-defence or it is authorized by the Security Council. The intervention on behalf of an insurgency against a legitimate government, for the purpose of effecting regime change, is quite clearly unlawful.

How is Canada’s involvement in an increasingly illegitimate and unlawful operation in its national interest? Several other NATO countries, including Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, have refused to participate for just these reasons. Canada’s traditional role on the international stage, from the time of Lester Pearson’s Nobel Prize-winning role in the Suez Crisis, has been to operate as an honest broker and peacekeeper. Yet now, while we refuse calls to commit funds to assist the establishment of meaningful democratic changes in Egypt and Tunisia, we throw our resources and national effort into an increasingly illegitimate military intervention in a neighboring Muslim state. Why exactly? If we are apparently so little interested in furthering the “Arab Awakening,” why are we intervening in an insurgency that sprung from the same seeds? Gaddafi’s regime poses no threat to our national security, and even the U.S. government has stated that Libya is not of critical strategic importance. The Canadian government has an obligation to explain precisely how this intervention is furthering the national interest, and is consistent with our national values and traditional roles.

The reality is that the primary reason for this policy is to curry favor with the Americans and to enhance Canada’s “influence” within NATO. It is the same reason that Canada has been so committed to the operations in Afghanistan, as Janice Stein and Eugene Lang have revealed in their book The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar.

Is that a sound reason for committing the nation to armed conflict? Is it worth the money and other resources that are being spent on these operations? Is it of sufficient value to justify the likely enmity that Canada is provoking in the Islamic world for its continuing involvement in military interventions that are perceived as imperialistic? And members of parliament should consider this question: is it really moral or right to ask members of the Canadian Forces to kill and die for marginal increases in Canadian influence within NATO?

So rather than rubber-stamping a decision to extend the operations in Libya, members of parliament have a duty to ask tough questions. Among these are: why exactly are we engaging in unlawful regime change? How is it in our national interest? How is it consistent with our values and traditional role in the world? For what purpose are we asking our servicemen and women to die?

The torture debate has once again seeped into the public discourse in America, and it has us focusing once again on all the wrong issues. Suggestions have been made that information that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided while being water-boarded helped lead the CIA to bin Laden’s door. This has prompted the likes of John Yoo (author of the notorious torture memos signed by Jay Bybee) and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, to argue that the case for water-boarding has been vindicated. Others, including Senator John McCain, have refuted the assertions that the trail to Bin Laden can be traced back to so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques.” In short, the debate is once again centering on the question of whether torture is effective.

First, it should be noted that the debate misconstrues the effectiveness argument. Few people would assert that torture can never produce so called “actionable intelligence.” The point, made extensively by FBI interrogators and other specialists in the field, is that torture produces less reliable intelligence than traditional (and lawful) methods of interrogation, since the victim will say anything to avoid the pain, some of it true but much of it not, creating the problem of trying to distinguish between fact and fiction. Moreover, a policy of torture creates longer term strategic costs in the effort to win over hearts and minds, which ultimately makes it counter-productive and ineffective from a broader perspective.

The key point, however, is that effectiveness is entirely beside the point. We should oppose and reject the use of torture even if it could be shown that it is effective. To his credit, John McCain also makes this argument. For those who do oppose torture, it is a profound mistake to be engaging in this debate about effectiveness. First of all, the arguments get reduced to the overly simplistic and binary question of whether it ever works, which is of course vulnerable to attack — just one example of torture producing one piece of accurate intelligence tends to undermine the entire position. Hence the debate today. But more importantly, engaging in this debate tends to suggest that if torture were found to be effective, then perhaps we might have to use it. But we would not, or should not, so why get trapped in this debate? We ought to stick to the real reasons for our objections.

So what are the real reasons for rejecting torture? The first is that it is abhorrent to both the principles underlying the rule of law, and our understanding of fundamental human rights — both of which are cornerstones in the foundation of our democracy. The common law rejected the practice of torture, and the admission of any evidence procured by torture, as early as the fifteenth century. It did so not only on the grounds that the information so obtained was inherently unreliable, but also because it was felt that the practice of torture would degrade all those who engaged in it, ultimately undermining the authority and effectiveness of the judicial system itself. And indeed, the continued use of torture by the Star Chamber in the sixteenth century became one of the central issues between the Crown and Parliament, with torture being cited as being “totally repugnant to the fundamental principles of English law… and repugnant to reason, justice, and humanity.” That view, of course, informed the drafting of the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

With the development of human rights law in the twentieth century the prohibition against torture was embedded in international law conventions. This reflected the recognition that to torture another human being is not only to treat them as being less than human, and to destroy aspects of their physical and mental integrity, but it is also to degrade and undermine the humanity of those who perpetrate the torture. The U.S. was a harsh critic of regimes that engaged in torture in the past. The prohibition against torture has become one of only four or five “peremptory norms” in international law — norms that apply to all states and which cannot be derogated from by any state, for any reason. The U.S. helped to champion these norms and develop the treaty regimes that support them. The other peremptory norms include the prohibitions against genocide, slavery, crimes against humanity, and piracy. Would we really countenance a debate on the possible effectiveness of genocide or slavery?

The purported moral arguments trotted out in support of torture are in fact fallacious. In the context of the famous ticking time bomb hypothetical, it is argued that it is surely moral to torture one person in order to save the lives of thousands — that the right to life trumps the right to physical integrity and security of the person. The problem of course is that this is a false construct. We will virtually never be in a situation in which we know for certain that a person has specific information which, if obtained through torture, we know will definitely save the lives of a specific set of people. At most we will think that we know that the person might have information, which may help us save some undetermined lives. Like the CIA officials who “knew” that Abu Zoubayidah was a high-level al Qaeda operative, certain to have crucial information, which would absolutely save American lives, when they ordered him water-boarded 83 times – only to discover that he was never even a member of al Qaeda, and that he had no such information. As a matter of morality it is not justifiable to torture one person on the mere possibility that it might save the lives of some unknown people, and a hypothetical that will virtually never occur is no basis for a public policy.

In short, we should reject torture because it is contrary to the fundamental principles underlying the rule of law and our understanding of human rights. It is utterly inconsistent with the values that form the foundation of our democracy. It will degrade us as a people. The experience of countries that have in the past century adopted the use of torture for “national security” purposes, illustrate how the policy seeps into other areas of the judicial system, corroding the integrity of criminal justice and undermining the authority of the state. The proponents of torture are no doubt animated by the desire to protect the people and interests of the United States. What they fail to understand is that the strategic objective of terrorism is to gut our value system and destroy the foundation of our democracy. Engaging in torture only helps them achieve their aims. Frankly, even having the debate is harmful to our national interests. We cannot champion the rule of law and espouse the benefits of democracy while we argue at home about whether to torture people.

As the crisis in Libya deepens there is increasing chatter about the possibility of military intervention. At the moment this is suggested most frequently in the form of a no-fly-zone over Libya, in order to prevent Gaddafi from using the air force against civilian protestors.

A debate is developing over the wisdom of any American or Western military involvement, but as usual there is little being said about the international law principles that would be implicated by such operations. And in the context of the growing unrest throughout the region, perceptions of the legality or illegality of any U.S. military action could have a significant impact on the developing narrative in the Arab world regarding America’s role, and how the emerging regimes ought to frame their relations with the U.S. going forward. The law matters in this situation.

The starting point of the legal analysis is the basic prohibition in international law on the use of armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The two primary exceptions to the prohibition are self-defense, which is obviously not applicable here, and operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council in response to a threat to international peace and security. There is no question, therefore, that if the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the imposition of a no-fly-zone in order to maintain peace and security in and around Libya, as it did in Iraq in the 1990s, the U.S. and its NATO allies could do so with the full imprimatur of international law.

The problems arise if the U.N. Security Council refuses to authorize such operations. France and Russia, both of which are permanent members with vetoes, have already expressed misgivings, and the three Arab members of the Security Council have been even more strongly critical of such a move. But surely, it will be said, the West cannot sit idly by if Libyan civilians are being slaughtered in ever increasing numbers by the Libyan government.

The ghosts of Rwanda continue to haunt us. Humanitarian motives require some kind of intervention to prevent crimes against humanity. And indeed, it has been argued that there is an emerging norm of customary international law in support of humanitarian intervention, as a third exception to the general prohibition on the use of force. This was the claim made in justification of the NATO air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, to prevent the ongoing atrocities against civilian populations in Kosovo. The claim has been further bolstered since by the development of the “responsibility to protect” principle.

The trouble is that while it may be an “emerging norm,” it is not yet an established principle of international law. The bombing of Yugoslavia continues to be characterized as a violation of international law, even if many think it was nonetheless justified. Thus, a unilateral U.S. or NATO intervention in Libya, whether in the form of an imposed no-fly-zone, or surgical strikes against Libyan forces, will run the very high risk of being similarly classified as illegal under international law. Even an overly aggressive involvement in the provision of rebel forces with weapons, money, and other logistical support, such that the U.S. is seen as directing or controlling their actions, could be construed as constituting an unlawful intervention, as the world court held with respect to U.S. support of the Contra rebels in Nicaragua in the 1980s.

These legal issues are not merely academic. While in the case of Yugoslavia it might be said that the illegality was trumped by the greater good, here the perception of illegality could have profoundly negative ramifications for the direction that the entire protest movement in the Middle East takes, and the relationship that the U.S. has with the region going forward. Within the growing policy debate, many are already arguing that any military intervention could taint the rebel cause and feed into narratives of ongoing U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Islamic states.

The questions of legality ought to inform this debate. Regardless of how noble and pure Western motives may be for mounting any humanitarian intervention in this instance, if it is conducted without U.N. Security Council authority, and can be credibly attacked as being unlawful, the risks of blowback are compounded exponentially. In the wake of a what many see as an illegal war of aggression against Iraq, any unilateral action in Libya, another oil-rich Islamic state with a history of conflict with the West, will be spun in ways that will be profoundly inimical to the image of the U.S. in the region.

This of course leaves us with the most agonizing of problems if the scale of the humanitarian crisis does indeed escalate. But unlike the situation in the former Yugoslavia, in which the Serbs had a strong ally in a veto-wielding Russia on the Security Council, there is good reason to believe that the Security Council will act if the Qaddafi regime begins to engage in crimes against humanity. There is breaking news that rebel leaders may themselves call for U.N. authorized intervention. But in the interim, the U.S. government is well advised to proceed very cautiously in its consideration of military options. The unlawful use of force is no way to encourage the emergence of democracies founded upon respect for the rule of law, and it could well undermine the ability of America to influence events in the region over the longer term.

The Senate is to take up ratification of the New START treaty for consideration again this week. While much has been written on the debate over the issue, there are important considerations that are not being sufficiently addressed. Quite apart from relations with Russia, a failure to ratify the treaty risks a fatal undermining of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

To understand why this is so requires us to go back to the origins of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (the NPT). When it was negotiated in the 1960s, to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, there was a grand bargain struck. In exchange for agreeing to forswear nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear countries that jointed the regime were promised assistance with the development of peaceful nuclear energy, and the recognized nuclear-weapons states committed to make meaningful efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

189 countries are now party to the NPT, and the treaty has survived as the primary legal framework for the international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no other legal prohibition against the development of nuclear weapons, and absent the NPT and its underlying bargain, there is indeed no principled basis why some countries should be permitted to maintain nuclear weapons while the rest are denied the right to develop them.

The violation of the NPT’s provisions are the basis upon which the international community has imposed sanctions and other measures upon Iran, North Korea, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. While there continue to be some persistent hold-outs, namely Israel, India and Pakistan, other countries with well developed nuclear programs such as South Africa and Libya, have in the past abandoned their nuclear weapons programs to restore their status within the regime. Given the worst fears in the 1960s, the NPT has been extremely successful, and enormously beneficial to the U.S. strategic interests.

What does any of this have to do with New START? START relates directly to the commitment of the nuclear weapons states to move towards disarmament. Early progress on nuclear disarmament in the 1970 and 80s came to a halt in the early 1990s. From the perspective of the non-nuclear weapons states, this failure constitutes a violation of the grand bargain.

The NPT was scheduled to expire in 2010, and there was considerable concern that the non-nuclear states would refuse to renew it. New START was sold in that process as being a reinvigoration of the disarmament process. It was part of the reason for President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize. New START, despite being a very modest commitment on the part of both the U.S. and Russia, and aside from its importance in terms of reestablishing vital mutual verification regimes and improving relations with Russia, was a crucial renewal of the commitment made to the non-nuclear states in the grand bargain.

A failure to ratify the treaty now will be seen as a violation of that re-commitment, and of the bargain itself. It could be the final blow to the regime. An increasing perception that the bargain has been abrogated could easily lead to an unraveling of the NPT. If that happens, there will be no legal regime in place to prevent nuclear proliferation. Without the NPT, we will have little grounds for invoking an international obligation to exert pressure on states like Iran to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. The nuclear double standard will be increasingly questioned, and states may balk at joining in sanctions. We will be left with nothing but political appeals to individual state interests and fears, which may or may not align with our own.

The failure of the NPT, and increased threat of nuclear proliferation will not be in U.S. interests. What is more, the U.S. will appear to have abandoned yet another international regime that it helped create, and its credibility will suffer accordingly. So New START is about so much more than relations with Russia. It is about the U.S. reestablishing its leadership in the global effort to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons in the world, and being true to its commitments.

Since the end of the Cold War, and through the era of the so-called “Global War on Terror,” Japan has struggled to define and develop a meaningful role for itself in the world of international politics. Constitutionally constrained from participating in collective security operations that involve the use of force, it has sought to cast itself as something of a “power for peace.”(1) In its handling of the crisis in Sri Lanka, however, it appears to be losing its way. While providing a great deal of aid to Sri Lanka, Japan is failing to exercise its considerable influence to help reduce the causes of further conflict, and risks not only undermining its own ambitions but also significantly harming the chances for peace and justice in Sri Lanka.

Almost exactly twenty years ago, the run-up to the Gulf War of 1991 created a major crisis within Japan that has had an enduring impact on the country’s politics and policy. The Japanese government came under enormous pressure to contribute to the international effort to resist the aggression of Iraq, in a region from which Japan obtained most of its energy supply. But Japan was constrained by its Constitution from any involvement in the military operations. It ended up providing support in other ways, including giving US $13 billion to the effort, more than any other country. Yet it was scorned (unfairly) for its “cheque book diplomacy,” received little gratitude for its help, and came out of the crisis with a deep sense that it would have to find more meaningful ways to contribute to the international community – particularly given that it continued to nurture ambitions to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Japan turned to limited involvement in U.N. peacekeeping, participation in the development of such concepts as “human security” (2), and perhaps most important, the use of foreign aid, particularly in areas of ongoing or potential conflict, to increase its influence and shape its identity as a “power for peace.” With respect to Sri Lanka, in 2003 Japan tried to take a leading role by hosting the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development in Sri Lanka and it played an important role in the Norway-led peace talks that continued in the period that followed. Japan’s foreign aid to Sri Lanka, in the form of loans, grants, and the provision of technical assistance, has been part of that effort, and Japan has given far more foreign aid in the last ten years than any other country (3). In the 2007-2008 period alone, Japan provided US $ 288 million, more than three times the amount given by each of the U.S. and the E.U. (4), and Sri Lanka was tenth on the list of Japan’s top aid recipients (5). The benefits to Sri Lanka from such aid should not be minimized, and it will no doubt contribute to the economic growth and stability essential to (while of course not sufficient for) the post-war peace process in Sri Lanka.

Nonetheless, precisely because Japan is by far the largest aid donor to Sri Lanka, it is in a position to exercise considerable influence over the policies of the government in respect of ongoing humanitarian and human rights issues. These include the continued need for reintegration of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into their home areas, ending the indefinite and completely unmonitored continued detention of thousands of suspected members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgents, the requirement for an independent investigation into war crimes allegations, taking meaningful steps to restore the rule of law, and generally moving to ensure that Tamil grievances are addressed (6). There is widespread consensus that a failure by the government to take these steps, as a means to resolving some of the underlying root-causes of the conflict will likely result in a resurgence of violence down the road (7).

There is little evidence, however, that Japan has used its unique position to meaningfully influence the government of Sri Lanka to develop policies that would address these issues and thus significantly enhance the chances for lasting peace. Back in 2008 when the ceasefire between the government and the LTTE broke down, Japan went so far as to announce that it was “considering” a review of its aid policy, but since then it has been conspicuously reluctant to criticize Sri Lanka government policy and conduct(8).

In the closing months of the conflict, when the world press was full of dire reports about hundreds of thousands of civilians having been trapped between opposing forces in the North, Japan did little publicly beyond issuing anodyne statements of concern and reaffirming its continued commitments to provide humanitarian assistance. In May 2009 the inaction of the Japanese government prompted the heads of Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, to issue a joint letter to then-prime minister Taro Aso, asserting that Japan must shoulder its responsibilities to help prevent a humanitarian disaster in Sri Lanka (9). Japan did little in response. In October, 2009, five international and Japanese human rights groups wrote to the newly elected DPJ government urging it to follow the lead of Western governments in demanding the release of thousands of detainees (10). The government remained largely silent.

What is more, in the post-conflict period, Japan has sent mixed messages. In June 2010, Yasushi Akashi, Japan’s special envoy to Sri Lanka, visited the country and addressed the issue of proposed U.N. investigations into war crimes committed during the final months of the conflict. Upon his arrival in Sri Lanka Akashi stated that the rest of the world ought not to dictate to Sri Lanka how to resolve war crimes issues or develop the post-conflict reconciliation process, and said that it was up to Sri Lanka to define any role to be played by a panel recently established by the U.N. Secretary General. Yet four days later, to a wider international audience, Akashi stated that Japan in fact backed efforts by the U.N. to investigate alleged war crimes, and said that he had actually pressed Colombo to allow the U.N. to participate in the reconciliation process (11).

Japan can and should do much more in pressing the government of Sri Lanka to address the ongoing humanitarian, human rights, and rule of law issues in the post-conflict period. What is more, aside from its significant leverage as Sri Lanka’s largest donor and debt-holder, Japan could draw upon its own experience as a credible source of some historical lessons and moral authority in advising the government of Sri Lanka. For while the analogies are of course very imperfect, with the nature of the conflict being very different, Japan’s experience in the aftermath of World War II could nonetheless offer some insights.

The strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the depth and warmth of that bi-lateral relationship speaks to the possibilities for peace between former enemies when the defeated are treated with magnanimity and respect. The manner in which Japan itself, in the wake of the utterly devastating destruction of World War II, managed to evolve from a militarist regime into a pacifist liberal democracy with a hugely successful economy, is powerful evidence of the possibilities for peaceful change in the aftermath of conflict. We should also remember that the prosecution of Japanese war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East served an important role in restoring the legitimacy of the new post-war Japanese regime, and accelerating the return of Japanese sovereignty. This historical experience is not without its relevance for how Colombo might want to think about how to deal with the war crimes issues (12).

Instead of exercising leadership in some of these ways, however, Japan not only looks ineffective but indeed runs the risk of appearing cynical and unprincipled in its pursuit of strategic and geopolitical interests at the expense of both the “power for peace” image it aspires to develop and the peace process in Sri Lanka itself. This is because Japan’s studied refusal to join in criticism of the Sri Lankan government, while it continues to pour money into infrastructure development, could be construed as not simply more ineffectual cheque-book diplomacy but in fact an investment in the regime — no matter what. The reasons for both looking the other way and actively supporting the Sri Lankan government could range from securing Japan’s sea-lanes to its primary energy sources in the Middle East to precluding China from muscling in on Japan’s perceived sphere of influence. Not only does this undermine Japan’s efforts to define itself as a state with the ability and commitment to work for the high ideals of peace and security in post-conflict regions, but also its continued unconditional and uncritical support for the Sri Lankan government could cause real harm to the peace process in Sri Lanka.

Protestations about “quiet diplomacy” notwithstanding, the failure Sri Lanka’s most significant development assistance partner to support U.N., EU, and other governmental and NGO pressure upon the Sri Lankan government to address the many significant humanitarian and human rights issues, and respond meaningfully to other Tamil grievances, provides the government of Sri Lanka with the necessary space to evade and withstand international pressure. This not only raises the risk of perpetuating the human tragedy that continues to unfold in Sri Lanka notwithstanding the end of warfare but in the longer run it contributes to the possibility of a resumption of the conflict in the future. Quite apart from the moral implications, such a consequence is not in Japan’s interests, from the perspective of either its strategic and geopolitical concerns, or its efforts to become a “power for peace” with U.N. Security Council aspirations.

* * *

1. Takashima Hatsuhisa, Foreign Ministry Spokesman, quoted in the “Japanese Wage Peace with Talks and Money, Pleasing Asians,” The New York Times, Dec. 8, 2002. For more on the effort, see Peng Er-Lam, “Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy in Sri Lanka,” 21:2 East Asia 3-17 (2004).

2. The most recent iteration of this effort was a symposium on the subject of Human Security sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 2010. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu

3. OECD data. It should also be noted that the motives for Japan’s foreign aid are mixed, and there is a body of scholarship that argues that Japanese ODA has during some periods been at least partially motivated by a desire to create markets and provide opportunities for Japanese companies. See, e.g., Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr Jr., eds., Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era (1993).

4. OECD, World Bank, available on-line at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/7/1878751.gif

5. OECD, available on-line at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/5/44285062.gif

6. On the current conditions of IDPs within Sri Lanka, see reports available at Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, available on-line at http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/srilanka; for more on the status and treatment of detainees, see International Commission of Jurists, Beyond Lawful Constraints: Sri Lanka’s Mass Detention of LTTE Suspects, September 2010, available for download at
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=349&sessID=&langage=1&myPage=Legal_Documentation&id=23159 ; on the breakdown of the rule of law since the end of the conflict, see James Yap and Craig Scott, “The Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Sri Lanka: An Overview”, unpublished paper prepared for the Sri Lanka Campaign on Peace and Justice, posted on SSRN athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682133

7. See, e.g., “Victory’s Rotten Fruit: The Government’s Unpleasant Triumphalism is Sowing the Seeds of Renewed Conflict,” The Economist, Jun. 11, 2009; and see generally, Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (2003);

8. See BBC News, “Japan ‘reviews’ aid to Sri Lanka,” January 15, 2008, available on line athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7189002.stm

9. “Joint Letter to Japanese Prime Minister on Sri Lanka,” Human Rights Watch, May 10, 2009, available on-line athttp://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/10/joint-letter-japanese-prime-minister-sri-lanka

10. “Japan: Break the Silence on Sri Lanka Rights Abuses,” Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2009, available on-line athttp://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/22/japan-break-silence-sri-lanka-rights-abuses

11. See “Japan Urges World Not to Dictate to Post-War Sri Lanka,” Reuters, June 16, 2010, available on-line at:http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65F23320100616; and “Japan Backs UN War Crimes Probe into Sri Lanka,” AFP, June 20, 2010, available on-line at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jY8mJYN7CrKTNKobNadHD1RvLiGQ

12. There is, of course, continued debate over the legitimacy and fairness of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, with many conservatives in Japan being strongly critical of the entire process. Perhaps ironically, given the point I am advancing, the Indian Judge, Radhabinod Pal, who was the only Judge to have dissented in holding that all the defendants should be found not guilty of all charges due to the illegitimacy of the tribunal process, continues to be revered by such conservatives today.