What Role and Rules for Canada’s Armed Drones?

Published a short essay, “What Role and Rules for Canada’s Armed Drones,” in the Canadian Global Affairs Institute: Policy Perspectives, Dec. 23, 2018. Here is the abstract:

The Canadian government announced in June 2017 that it was planning to purchase and deploy armed drones. Yet to date it has provided virtually no information on how and for what purpose such armed drones would be used, beyond anodyne comments that they would be used like any other conventional weapon. However, conventional weapons have varying capabilities and purposes, and implicate international law in different ways as a result. Armed drones have been primarily used for the purpose of targeted killing, in ways that have raised significant legal questions and triggered claims of excessive civilian deaths. Canadians should be concerned about how, for what purpose, and according to what limitations the government plans to deploy armed drones. Other countries have provided greater transparency than Canada regarding the law and policy framework governing the use of armed drones. This short essay reviews how armed drones have been used elsewhere, explains the significant legal issues that are implicated by the different ways in which drones have been used and what that implies for the role of Canadian armed drones. It suggests that strict, clear and publicly disclosed limits be placed on drone use to ensure compliance with Canada’s international law obligations.

Japan’s Definition of Armed Attack and ‘Bloody Nose’ Strikes Against North Korea

(published in Just Security, Feb. 1, 2018)

Shinzō_Abe_and_Donald_Trump_in_Palm_Beach_(2)There has been an important discussion in the last couple of weeks over the legality of possible limited strikes, part of a so-called “bloody nose” strategy, by the United States against North Korea. The main issue of that debate has been quite conclusively determined: such a strike would not be legal. And as Victor Cha, the White House’s pick, until recently, to be ambassador to South Korea, laid out in an op-ed this week, it would be deeply misguided as a policy choice. There remains more to be said, however, about a couple of interesting and potentially important questions regarding Japan’s position in relation to such strikes. One, which has been raised but not fully answered in the discussion, relates to whether Japan has already somehow consented in advance to U.S. action in collective self-defense of Japan. The second, which has not been explicitly addressed at all, is whether Japan defines “armed attack” for purposes of triggering the right of self-defense differently than does the U.S.

To recap briefly, the debate was set off by an essay in Lawfare by two West Point professors, Army Lt. Col. Shane Reeves and Army Capt. Robert Lawless, arguing that limited strikes on North Korea would be lawful. Virtually all elements of their argument were quite persuasively demolished by Kevin Jon Heller in Opinio Juris, and Michael Schmitt and Ryan Goodman here in Just Security.

A central premise of one strand of the Reeves/Lawless argument was that the test-firing of a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the territory of Japan could constitute an armed attack, triggering an American right to use force as an exercise of collective self-defense. They were dismissive of the position of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that collective self-defense requires a request from and consent of the country under attack, suggesting that the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan (the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty”), “may provide a basis” for American action. They went on to note that, in their view, Japan was in any event very unlikely to oppose American strikes in defense of Japan.

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Canada’s Support of U.S. Strikes on Syria Harms International Law

(Published in the HuffPost, May 1, 2017.)

Tomahawk-Missile

In the immediate aftermath of the American missile strike against Syria, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that Canada “fully supports” the U.S. in its “limited and focused action to degrade” the Syrian government’s chemical weapons capability. Many Canadians appear to think that this was the right call, given the heinous nature of the chemical weapons attacks in Syria. But the U.S. missile strikes violated international law, and weakened the international rule of law. Canada’s swift and strong support for those unlawful acts will in turn do further harm to the international law system. That is not at all consistent with Canada’s traditional support for international law. It was not necessary, and the Canadian government should re-consider such support for future American unilateral attacks.

Let us begin with the question of legality. Article 2(4) of The United Nations Charter and customary international law provide for a strict prohibition against the use of force against other states. There are only two exceptions to that prohibition, permitting states to use force either in individual or collective self-defense (Article 51), or when authorized to do so by the UN Security Council for purposes of maintaining or restoring international peace and security (Articles 39 and 42).

There is an amazingly strong consensus among international law scholars, even within the United States, that the U.S. missile strikes constituted a clear violation of the prohibition against the use of force. These views have been articulated in such renowned national security and international law blog sites as Lawfare, Just Security, EJILTalk!, and Opinio Juris. Such a consensus is remarkable given how divided opinion has been on the invasion of Iraq, drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan, or even the American strikes within Syria against ISIS. There is so little disagreement on these recent strikes, however, because there is virtually no plausible argument that they satisfy either of the established exceptions.

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Why and How to Amend Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution

Ritsumeikan-webIn April I published an article on why supporters and defenders of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the war-renouncing provision, should be developing proposals for how to amend the provision. The article was published in the Ritsumeikan Journal of Peace Studies, in both English: Change It to Save It: Why and How to Amend Article 9, 18 Ritsumeikan J. Peace Studies (2017), and in Japanese: 憲法9条を再生させるための改正論ーなぜ、どのように9条を改正するのか、立命館平和研究18号(2017). The abstract in English is as follows:

Defenders of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which renounces the use of force and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces, have consistently worked to block any and all attempts to amend the provision. The government of Japan, having purported to “reinterpret” the provision in 2015, is now well positioned to finally achieve its goal of forcing some form of amendment. This article argues that the champions of Article 9 must, in order to save its most successful and core features, begin to develop alternative proposals for its amendment.

The article begins with a review of the meaning and operation of Article 9. It notes that the first paragraph, Article 9(1) (which is the prohibition on the use of force), is a clear constitutional rule that has effectively constrained government policy, but that the second paragraph, Article 9(2) (which prohibits the maintenance of armed forces and denies the rights of belligerency), has been transformed into an ambiguous standard that has been increasingly ineffective, and has given rise to a dangerous gap between norm and reality.

In arguing why Article 9 should be amended, the article explains the weaknesses in the provision that arise from the ambiguity and ineffectiveness of Article 9(2), analyzes the significant dangers inherent in the government amendment proposals, and the harm that will be done by the “reinterpretation” if it is not replaced by way of amendment. In explaining how to amend Article 9, the article provides draft language as a starting point for debate. It is designed to preserve and clarify the constraints on the use of force; eliminate the harmful gap between the current reality and the constitutional language, and establish civilian control and clear separation of powers in national security decision-making; and clarify the role of judicial review in enforcing the provision.